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/> This rule is very narrow because people, who suffer from certain mental disorders for instants irresistible impulse and psychopaths in the case of Byrne, cannot raise the defence of insanity. Because they know the nature and quality of their act or that it is legally wrong but is nonetheless unable to stop themselves from committing it. Thus, those at whom the defence should be aimed at are unable to rely on it. Section 2 Homicide Act 1957 the defence of Diminished responsibility (DR), recognise these types of condition, DR reduces the conviction of manslaughter with more discretion on the part of the judge in regards to sentencing. Lord denning in bratty states “when a man is charged with murder, and knew what he was doing and claims “i couldn’t help myself” is no defence in itself”. Irresistible impulse may be evidence of DR byrne.

Nature and quality of act

Finally the defence of insanity is not available in ignorance of the law Windle held that a defendant who is suffering from a serious recognised mental illness and who does not know that his act is morally wrong cannot use a defence of insanity when he knows that his act is legally wrong confirmed in Jhonson. An Australian case refused to follow this decision. In Johnson the Court of Appeal thought that the Australian case had good points but recognised that they were obliged to follow Windle. This suggested that the law on insanity is long overdue and urgent review of the law is needed.

The word 'wrong' should be interpreted to mean morally wrong. This issue attracts debate. Decision in Windle claims the word 'wrong' in the M'Naghten Rules means legally wrong this has been supported judicially by Lord Devlin stating: “I do not see how an accused man can be heard to say that he knew he was doing an act which he knew to be contrary to law, and yet he is entitled to be acquitted at the hands of the law. Guilt, whether in relation to the M'Naghten Rules, or any other rules, means responsibility in law.”

In any event, the 'knowledge of wrong' interpreted in Windle provides a very narrow ground of exemption because even disturbed people generally know that murder, is a crime. It appeared that the judges had taken a generous approach in practice in establishing the ‘wrong’ test whilst directing juries and little attempt was made in many cases to distinguish between ignorance of legal wrong and ignorance of moral wrong.

Once the disease of the mind has been established, it must then be proven that it induced a defect of reason and the courts have interpreted this as a complete loss of power or reasoning and that the defendant does not know the nature and quality of his act . Again, this is very stringent and outside of medical opinion that even psychotics can appreciate the nature and quality of their acts.

This is further exasperated by the courts’ tendency to adopt a narrow interpretation of the requirement. In the case of Windle , it was asserted that the relevant test was whether the defendant knew that its actions were in breach of law. The issue of whether the defendant knew what they were doing was morally wrong was not held to be relevant. However, this leads to undesirable results. In Sutcliffe , the defendant was a schizophrenic, however had a clear knowledge and appreciation that his actions were contrary to the law and was therefore held not to be insane. This in itself would suggest