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cessary in identification. Evidence of previous history can be held admissible as in R v Philips. [15] The common law authorities will continue to provide valuable guidance since gateway (c) in effect gives statutory force to a doctrine established at common law. [16]

Section 101(1)(d) CJA 2003 “it is relevant to an important matter in issue between the defendant and the prosecution” provides the admissibility of evidence going to the guilt of the accused as well as credibility. S.101(1)(d) is supplemented by s.103(2) where “matters in issue” include the question of propensity to commit the offence and whether the propensity is to be untruthful. S.103(2) also defines the categories of offences which can be

admitted as propensity to include “offences of the same description” [17] or the “same category.” According to R v Chopra, [18] evidence of the accused’s propensity to offend in the manner charged was prima facie inadmissible at common law, whilst under the 2003 Act it is prima facie admissible. Evidence of bad character relevant to the guilt and admissible under gateway (d) is not confined to evidence of propensity and similar fact evidence. At common law, other types of misconduct were admissible to establish the prosecution’s case. By applying R v Grooves, [19] it was held in R v Yalman [20] that once there was prima facie for Y to answer, the evidence of using drugs was admissible on the issue whether he has knowingly involved in the importation. Following common law principles, the admissibility of evidence relevant to the issue of guilt under s.101(1)(d) will continue to operate relating to the nature of defence. The notion for “similar fact” evidence to fall within a closed list of defined categories of relevance was firmly rejected in Harris v DPP. [21]

S.101(1)(e) stated that “it has substantial probative value in relation to an important matter [22] in issue between the accused and co-accused.” [23] Section 104(1) states that evidence of a propensity to be untruthful is admissible under S.101(1)(e) only if the nature or conduct of his defence is such as to undermine the co-defendant's defence. In both Lowery v R [24] and R v Douglass, [25] where one accused adduces evidence of his own lack of propensity and this goes to the issue of a co-accused guilt, the co-accused can call contradictory evidence. However in R v Randall [26] the House of Lords confined that there must be cases in which the propensity of one accused may be relied on by the other, irrespective of whether he has put his character in issue. [27]

S.101(1)(f) CJA 2003 permits prosecution evidence to correct a false impression given by the defendant reflects an old common law rule. S.105(1)(a) indicates that “the false impression must relate to the defendant, and evidence to correct such impression is evidence which has probative value in correcting it(S.105(1(b)).” S.105(2) specifies under what circumstances the defendant is treated as being responsible in making an assertion. So by s.105 (3) a defendant can withdraw or disassociate himself from a false impression and most importantly s.105 (6) restricts the extent of the evidence which is admissible to that which “goes no further than is necessary to correct the false impression.” This is a departure from the common law rule that allow cross-examination on the whole of a defendant’s character. In R v Winfield, [28] it was held that the prosecution were