英语论文网

ays an important role in protecting vulnerable consumers from the effects of draconian contract terms. But I am less enthusiastic about its construction into contracts between parties of equal bargaining strength, who should be considered capable of being able to make contracts of their choosing and expect to be bound by their terms'.

In Britvic Soft Drinks v Messer UK it was considered that the approach in Watford should be seen against the background of facts of that case and not on the equality of bargaining power. The goods which supplied to be incorporated in the product were not of satisfactory quality and the Court held that the clause which excluded liability for breach of the requirement of satisfactory quality was unreasonable. The exclusion of liability for faulty equipment and liability for faulty work cannot be excluded.

Conclusion

The reasonableness test is flexible and the requirement of reasonableness stands at the centre of the process of the UCTA but there has been development and in Common Law. The reasonableness requirement in sale of goods contracts is confined by some features such as the parties bargaining strength, the experience of the buyer and who is best placed to insure the loss, which the Courts consider when they have to decide whether a term in the contract meets that requirement. It can be seen that clauses are subject to the requirement of reasonableness by the UCTA, but they apply if the Courts consider that it is reasonable for them to do so.

Question three

Introduction

Jonathon wants to appoint distributors, one in each of the three countries. To appoint the distributors, Jonathon has to make a distribution agreement with them. Distribution agreement is a vertical agreement where suppliers agree to supply distributors with goods, and distributors sell them to their customers in a specified territory. The customers would have no contract with the supplier. Distributor is an independent party who bears the risk in transactions with third parties.

Vertical Agreements Block Exemption

Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty of Rome prohibits as incompatible agreements between undertakings, that may affect trade between Member States and which prevent, restrict or distort competition. If Jonathon offers his products on the market using the distributors on a concerted practice, it will be an agreement between undertakings.

A distribution agreement which have anticompetitive results can be exempted under article 81(3), which makes Articles 81(1) prohibition inapplicable, and allows restrictive contractual conditions to be imposed, provided that they contribute to consumer benefit and 'economic progress'.

If the distribution agreement meets the conditions set out in the Block Exemption Regulation which applies to vertical agreements, then is exempted from Article 81(1). The agreement must not contain any hard-core restrictions or non- compete obligations. Also the block exemption will not apply where the supplier's market share exceeds the 30%.

Hard-core Restrictions

Hard-core restrictions in vertical agreements include resale price maintenance and territorial and customer restrictions on resale. There are hard-core restrictions which apply to agreements between competitors, and agreements between non competitors. If one hard-core restrictio本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。