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摘要：Hume can hardly be right to claim that from the fact that one is not motivated to do the right thing, it follows that one cannot understand what the right thing to do is. Finally his efforts to explain how moral distinctions arise from human passions seem to invoke the very kind of substantive, non-instrumental reasoning which he denies in his works.

ccording to him, reason can enter the picture only as a lackey, informing the agent of useful facts concerning which actions will serve his goals and desires, but “never deigning to tell the agents which goals and desires he should have” (Frankl 1985:261).
At the same time, it is necessary to point out that in moral and ethical context such radicalism in Hume’s views is not so radical as it might seem to be. In fact the philosopher argues that immoral behavior is not immoral because it is against reason. He first claims that “moral beliefs are intrinsically motivated – if you believe killing is wrong, you will be ipso facto motivated not to kill and to criticise killing and so on” (Frankl 1985:295). However, he reminds that the reason alone can motivate nothing – reason discovers matters of fact and logic, and it depends on individual’s desires and preferences. Consequently, reason alone cannot motivate moral beliefs. On the other hand Hume does not absolutely deny the role of reason since it works though under the influence of human emotions and desires.
Furthermore, Hume advanced the idea that the explanation of moral principles is to be sought in the utility they tend to promote. At this respect it is quite noteworthy to mention that Hume argues that moral spectators approve of benevolence and benevolence is approved of because it has utility.
At the same time, it should be said that Hume’s ethic theory is not deprived of some controversial points. For instance, attempting to determine whether an agent’s motivating character trait is natural or artificial, he decides this one virtue at a time. For him, the natural virtues include benevolence, meekness, charity and generosity. By contrast, the artificial virtues include justice, keeping promises, allegiance and chastity. Paradoxically in fact, Hume classes the key virtues that are necessary for well-ordered state as artificial, and he classes only the more supererogatory virtues as natural.
Conclusion
Thus, taking into account all above mentioned, it is possible to conclude that Hume’s ethical views are based on denying the role of reason and exaggerating the role of human emotions, desires and preferences. At the same time his moral and ethical theory is to a certain extent controversial and often justly criticised. In fact he is not very persuasive mainly because his argument against moral rationalists seems to confuse questions of moral epistemology with questions of moral motivation. Hume can hardly be right to claim that from the fact that one is not motivated to do the right thing, it follows that one cannot understand what the right thing to do is. Finally his efforts to explain how moral distinctions arise from human passions seem to invoke the very kind of substantive, non-instrumental reasoning which he denies in his works.

Bibliography:
1. Lavine, T. Z. (1984). From Socrates to Sartre: The Philosophic Quest. New York: Bantam Books.
2. Frankl, Victor E. (1985). Man's Search for Meaning. New York: Washington Square Press.