英语论文网

Stock-based incentive， the important content and specific forms compensation system design, is also adopted widely in enterprise managers paid incentive system in developed western countries. compensation system make the stock ownership incentive system operators and enterprise performance closely linked,which is an effective incentive compensation system.
The paper discusses the issues along with combining the empirical analysis and normative research theory . Theoretically this paper tries to put forward the question , research significance,thought and method from the view of the new system economics in order to lay the research foundation for the analysising executives share issues.On the basis of combing the basic theory in the stock ownership incentive and equity incentive theory, the paper empirically analysises taking a-share commercial circulation listed companies as sample ,and inspect the performance of company executives shares is whether significantly influenced or not and puts forward the countermeasures and the implementation of equity incentive measures.
From the above the related analysis of business executives shares and corporate performance of listed companies in China of, we can conclude multivariate linear regression analysis. The results show that, with each percentage point increase in growth, main business income growth nearly 0.587 percentage points, With the total remuneration rate each percentage point increase in net profit growth nearly 2.549 percentage points.the model has three indexes,such as asset scale, and the share concentration ratio.total remuneration rate of each percentage point increase in asset scale, net assets yield increase 3.703 percentage points, Equity concentration each percentage point increase in net assets yield increase 3.113 percentage points, While total remuneration rate each percentage point increase in net assets yield increased 0.014 percentage points, The business income growth, with a statistical significance, and the total remuneration rate each percentage point increase in annual increase of total remuneration management 0.485 percentage points.Further analysis, we can get some conclusiones.first, the business listed company executives in Cina have widespread phenomenon, that is ,the share holding ,and commercial industry average net assets yield is higher than the market average, which it shows that the listed companies in China's business executives shares in listed companies on the performance.second, the business listed company executives in Cina exists significant positive correlation between the numbers and net assets yield, but the correlation coefficient is small, this shows that business executives shares in listed companies listed companies to ascend is good, but the performance of incentive effect is very limited.
The reasons are as follows,firstly, executives shares incentive mechanism is not perfect. For example, executive compensation for often focus on short-term monetary incentive, but for long-term incentive system arrangement, the proportion of shares, executives and the acquisition modes etc are not perfect. If the holding senior executives is low proportion, it cannot executives' interests and the interests of the shareholders together, meanwhile, the shareholding system in listed companies from the start, executives shares is only an internal staff本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。