Finance Essay-共同基金投票与养老保险 [5]
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论文字数:6336论文编号:org201509281522545339语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文
关键词:基金投票养老保险Proxy voting
摘要:本文是金融学essay范文,通过审查共同基金和公司之间的联系,并结合实际的共同基金投票结果,探讨养老保险业务是否会影响共同基金和公司之间的联系,并通过更多的激励机制来支持投资管理。
rage mutual funds that manage their pension. Suppose that management predicts that the percentage of voting support for a management sponsored proposal is just below 50%. In that case, to pass the proposal, management attempts to pressure mutual funds that manage its pension plans to vote in favor of management. With a small shift, management can win the proposal as the marginal effect of mutual fund voting shift in close votes is large. [3] However, management will withdraw or alter the proposal if it predicts that the proposal would fail with far below 50% of voting support. Furthermore, management will not act if it predicts the proposal will win with far above 50% of voting support. To the extent that marginal effects of voting support of mutual funds for management proposals are greater for close votes than for non-close votes, I expect that the influence on proxy voting of pension ties is more likely to be detected in close votes rather than non-close votes. Therefore, the analysis of this study involves the voting outcomes for close votes. Although there is no such discontinuity in shareholder sponsored proposal, examining close votes for shareholder proposals is also meaningful given that marginal effects of mutual voting shift is large, with a small shift from voting against management to voting for management.
The ISS recommendation
As suggested by prior literature, the ISS has a non-trivial influence on mutual fund voting behavior. As a leading proxy advisory firm, the ISS gives recommendations on proxy voting by publishing general
guidelines on each issue of each proposal or by providing case-by-case recommendations. Cotter, Palmiter, and Thomas (2011) find that voting support of mutual funds decreases by 68.3% for ISS unfavorable management proposals and increases by 53.1% for ISS unfavorable shareholder proposals. Choi, Fisch, and Kahan (2010) observe that the cases in which mutual funds always follow management of their portfolio firms are twice as many as cases in which mutual funds always follow the ISS. In considering the importance of the impact of the ISS recommendation on proxy voting, Ashraf et al. (2010) segregates its sample into shareholder proposals recommended by ISS and shareholder proposals opposed by the ISS. They detect a negative association between voting support of fund families and pension business ties only for the first case. When the ISS opposes shareholder proposals, there is no association between fund family voting and pension ties. Considering that mutual funds likely follow the ISS advice for potential value reducing shareholder proposals regardless of whether they have business ties, their finding is somewhat predictable. If we assume that the ISS provides reliable advice and that mutual funds are the only shareholders, the ISS unfavorable shareholder proposals are comparable to the ISS favorable management proposals. This is because both mutual funds and management likely consider the former as value reduction proposals and consider the latter as value improving proposals. However, for the ISS favorable shareholder proposals, mutual funds consider them to be value increasing while management votes against them as it always opposes shareholder sponsored proposals. When there is a disagreement between management and mutual funds, management acts to influence votes by using mutual funds' ability to attract pension inflows as an incentive. Likewise, for the ISS unfavorab
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