Finance Essay-共同基金投票与养老保险
论文作者:www.51lunwen.org论文属性:短文 essay登出时间:2015-09-29编辑:chenyuting点击率:18060
论文字数:6336论文编号:org201509281522545339语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文
关键词:基金投票养老保险Proxy voting
摘要:本文是金融学essay范文,通过审查共同基金和公司之间的联系,并结合实际的共同基金投票结果,探讨养老保险业务是否会影响共同基金和公司之间的联系,并通过更多的激励机制来支持投资管理。
Finance Essay-共同基金投票与养老保险
因为共同基金是最大的权益持有人,也因为共同基金管理的退休资产不断增多,共同基金管理者可能会有更多的激励机制来支持管理,以吸引和留住养老事业。我通过审查共同基金和公司之间的联系,并结合实际的共同基金投票结果,探讨养老保险业务是否会影响共同基金和公司之间的联系。在基金的家庭层面,我发现养老基金与共同基金的投票支持是一个积极的关系。当一个家庭中的资金投票产生分歧时,这种关系就变得更强了。在个人基金的水平,我发现如果他们被列入作为投资组合的退休金计划中的一个投资选择时,个人基金更可能被投资管理。这表明,美国证券交易委员会(SEC)至少应该考虑最近在美国劳工联合会-产业工会联合会提议的请愿书,美国证券交易委员会要求共同基金披露企业投资的业务关系。
简介
在过去的几十年中,由于机构持股比例有所增加,在企业治理中机构投资者是否发挥积极作用一直存在着很大的学术兴趣。但是,重要的是要注意,由于潜在的利益冲突,所有的机构不一定有相同的动机来监控管理。特别是,共同基金,在美国最大的股权持有人,以前被认为是自由的利益冲突,因为他们不与投资组合公司做生意。
根据美国投资公司协会,截至2011年底,401(K)计划资产的61.2%和个人退休账户(IRA)市场资产的45.1%投资于共同基金。
Mutual Fund Voting And Pension Ties Finance Essay
Because mutual funds are the largest equity holders and because the retirement assets that are managed by mutual funds have been growing, mutual fund managers may have more incentives to support management in order to attract and retain pension business. I explore whether pension business ties have an impact on voting behaviors of mutual funds by examining the link pension business ties between mutual funds and the firms to actual mutual fund voting outcomes. At the fund family level, I find a positive relation between pension ties and mutual funds' voting support for management. This relation becomes stronger when there is a voting divergence among funds within the same families. At the individual fund level, I find that individual funds are more likely to vote with management if they are included as one of the investment options of the pension plan of their portfolio firms. This suggests that the SEC should at least consider the recent petition from the AFL-CIO proposing that the SEC require mutual funds to disclose business ties with the firms in which they invest.
简介-INTRODUCTION
As institutional ownership has increased over the last few decades, there has been much academic interest in whether institutional investors take an active role in corporate governance. It is important to note, however, that due to potential conflicts of interest, all institutions do not necessarily have the same incentives to monitor management. In particular, mutual funds, the largest equity holders in the United States, were previously considered to be free of conflicts of interest because they did not do business with portfolio firms. [1]
According to the Investment Company Institute, as of the end of 2011, 61.2 percent of 401(K) plan assets and 45.1 percent of Individual Retirement Account (IRA) market assets were invested in mutual funds. [2] Since one half of the IRA market assets and 401(K) plan assets have been held by mutual funds since the late 1990s, there is a potential for conflicts of interest in mutual funds, and thereby fund managers have less incentive to exert an effort to monitor management and more incentive to support management in order to attract and retain the assets from the retirement market. Several studies document that mutual fund managers pursue their own interests at the expense of fund investors. For example, Cohen and Schmidt (2008) find that fund families acting as trustees systematically overweight their sponsor firms and even increase their holdings of the sponsor firms' stock when other mutual funds are engaged in aggregate selling of sponsor firms' shares. Other than through trading, mutual funds can sup
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