The Making of the 'Symbol Emperor System' in Postwar Japan
Author(s): David A. Titus
Source: Modern Asian Studies, Vol. 14, No. 4 (1980), pp. 529-578
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/312247
代写留学生论文Accessed: 19/07/2009 22:03
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Modern Asian Studies, 14, 4 (I980), pp. 529-578. Printed in Great Britain.
The Makingo f the 'SymboEl mperoSr ystem'
in PostwaJra pan
DAVID A. TITUS
Wesleyan University
THE imperial institution's capacity for survival, despite the many
transformations in Japanese society and politics over the past thirteen
hundred years, has few parallels in the
history of human institutions. In
1965 the Imperial Household Agency could legitimately claim that the
structure for managing the palace even today, though changed several
times, including the 'epoch-making' renovation of 1947, could be traced
back to the Taiho Institutes of 70I.1
Perhaps the greatest challenge to the very existence of the imperial
institution came in the wake of Japan's defeat in i945, and the unprecedented
occupation by foreign powers that ensued. When faced
with the 'option' of'unconditional surrender' held forth by the Potsdam
Declaration of July 26, I945, Japan's leaders understandably hesitated.
The fundamental reason for their hesitation was the fate of the imperial
institution if Japan surrendered on the terms offered by Potsdam. The
debate lasted over two weeks. After two atomic bombings, and a
declaration of war by the Soviet Union, the emperor broke the deadlock
among his leading officials and accepted the terms of Potsdam. Those
who argued that the imperial institution would survive the surrender
and occupation barely carried the day. But their judgment ultimately
proved correct.2 Today's imperial institution is in no serious danger of
Earlier versions of this
essay were given at the Columbia University Seminar on
Modern Japan and the New England Seminar on Japan at Harvard. I should like
to thank the members of both for many helpful criticisms and suggestions. Leon Sigal,
Charles Sheldon, and Lawrence Olso
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