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英国留学生作业代写：股票发行公司与股票价格理论
Theories On Equity Issuing Firms And Stock Price

在这一部分中，我们描述了用以解释股权融资发行和股票表现的影响的相关理论。一些理论解释了企业股权融资能力与股票绩效之间的正相关关系的原因。另一方面，其他理论解释了企业股权融资能力与股票价格绩效之间的负相关关系的原因。
我们专注发行公司的私募股权配售。发散的过程中，公共和私人发行可能导致对市场反应的不同影响。大多数研究者都集中在影响发行公司股权私人、市场和经营绩效的因素。他们利用盈余绩效、信息不对称、监测、股价运行、代理成本和企业规模解释来找出企业为什么发行私募股权投资的原因。监测、信息、确认、过度反馈效应假说用来解释发行公司股票价格绩效。我们的研究中，我们特别强调信息不对称和监测假设。

In this section, we describe relevant theories which use to explain the effects of equity financing issuing and stock performance. Some theories explain the reasons for positive relationship between firms' equity financing capacity and stock performance. On the other hand, other theories explain the reasons for negative relationship between firms' equity financing capacity and stock-price performance.

We focus private equity placements of issuing firms. The divergence in the process of public and private issuances may lead to the different impact on market reaction. Most of researchers are focusing on factors which influence to issue equity privately, market and operation performances of issuing firms. They use earning performance, asymmetric information, monitoring, stock price run-up, agency cost and firm size explanations to find out why firms issue private equity. Monitoring, information, confirming, over feedback effects hypotheses use to explain the issuing firms' stock-price performance. Our study we give special emphasis on information asymmetry and monitoring hypothesis. The asymmetric information and monitoring hypothesis are described in more detailed in following sections.

Asymmetric Information Hypothesis 信息不对称假说
Various studies indicate that the occurrence of major events or disclosure of information affects a company's stock performance, which is called as 'information content effect'. Myers and Majluf (1984) pointed out that public offering pass a message to the market that managers consider that the firms are overvalued. They explained that the top level executives have precious and valuable information about the value of the firm than outside investors, firms may not issue equity to public as far as the proportion of existing assets transferred to the new shareholders are greater than the proportion of increased firm value retained by the existing shareholders[52]. Hence, underinvestment arising from the information asymmetry between informed managers and the market reduces the firm value. Therefore, if managers are economically able to convey inside information about the value of assets-in-place to the market, they can mitigate the underinvestment problem (Myers and Majluf, 1984)[52].

Asquith and Mullins (1986) and, Masulis and Ronald (1986) are also supported to this behavior of new equity issue relative to information asymmetry, which demonstrate that firms reported a negative abnormal returns after the announcement of new issues[87,94]. Myers and Majluf (1984)[52]'s model be unsuccessful to capture how timing of the information asymmetry affects new equity issue. This vaccume filled by Korajczyk et al. (1991)[90] and they stated that firms regularly disclose information in the form of earnings release and audit annual reports. Hence, firms issuing equity when the market is better informed tend to reduce the magnitude of ne