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Company to pay vocational training?_英国论文范文

论文作者:英语论文网论文属性:硕士毕业论文 thesis登出时间:2011-09-23编辑:zn1987点击率:3746

论文字数:9533论文编号:org201109231036387029语种:英语 English地区:英格兰价格:$ 66

关键词:英国论文范文CompanyVocational trainingInvestment

摘要:英语论文网专业提供英国论文范文,英国留学生毕业论文等论文定制服务。本文介绍了这两个问题影响了培训市场的模式,并检查他们的影响,以及各项政策措施的影响。

SHOULD FIRMS BE REQUIRED TO PAY FOR VOCATIONAL TRAINING?

Failure in the training market may result from credit constraints and other capital market imperfections, deterring potential trainees, or labor market imperfections creating externalbene®ts for ®rms. This paper presents a model of a training market affected by both problems, and examines their impact, and the impact of various policy measures, on the welfare of workers and ®rms. It is shown that there is a rationale for imposing training costs on ®rms, irrespective of the cause of under-investment. However, training levy schemes in which the levy depends upon the wage bill are shown to address capital market imperfections only.

Policy-makers in several countries have attempted to increase investment in vocational training by imposing a training levy on ®rms. In the United Kingdome policy of this type operated between 1964 and 1982. For each of 28industries, an Industrial Training Board was given statutory powers to raise levy from the ®rams within the industry, and redistribute it in the form of grants to those ®rams deemed to train their employees to an appropriate level. In1971 France instituted a similar policy requiring employers to spend a certain percentage of payroll costs on training. The required percentage has gradually been raised, standing now at 112%, and the system continues to operate with little political controversy. In contrast, the very similar Australian Training Guarantee Scheme faced strong opposition from employers' organizations and was suspended in 1994, after only four years.
The supposed economic rationale for such intervention is that training creates external beets for other ®rms. A ®ram will be deterred from investingsuf®ciently in training because trained workers might leave, and the ®mould then be unable to capture the beets. A mechanism is needed tonsure that ®rams cannot free-ride by `poaching' skilled labor from other®rms. But this argument has found little favor with economists in recent years, and few have defended the use of levy schemes.
Perfectly competitive markets ensure optimal investment in training as follows. Provided that the skills are `general'2 (Becker, 1962) they can be traded in a competitive labor market: a generally-trained worker is paid his marginal product, and thus receives the full return from the training investment. Moreover, he is fully informed about the expected return, and can borrow at a competitive interest rate in order to ®Nance the investment. The decision as to whether to undertake training is his alone; even if training takes place `on-the-job' the ®ram is involved only passively, as the supplier of the training which the worker demands, and the worker pays by accepting lower wages during the training period. The ®ram will not invest in training, since it cannot obtain a return. But optimal investment follows from the decisions of rational workers.

References
Acemoglu, D. (1996). `Credit constraints, investment externalities and growth'. In Booth and Snowier (1996).
Acemoglu, D. (1997) `Training and innovation in an imperfect labor market'. Review of Economic Studies, vol. 64, pp. 445±64.
Acemoglu, D. and Pinscher, J.-S. (1998). `Why do ®rams train? Theory and evidence'. Quarterly Journal of Economics, vol. 113, no. 1, pp.79±120.
Acemoglu, D. and Pinscher, J.-S. (1999a). `The structure of wages and inves论文英语论文网提供整理,提供论文代写英语论文代写代写论文代写英语论文代写留学生论文代写英文论文留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。

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