英语论文网

不久前,世界已经经历了史上最严重之一的金融危机。金融业受到重创，全球实体经济放缓，并且进入到了严重的衰退期，导致了实际产出大幅度下降。这场危机扰乱了金融中介机制,使其对私营部门的信贷能力显著下降。在许多国家,财政和货币当局将非常规的信贷政策付诸实践,包括直接贷款信贷市场，以应对金融危机并减少其宏观经济的溢出效应。
在第二次世界大战之前,美国联邦储备理事会(美联储,fed)放弃了干预私营部门长期基金信贷市场。这些传统的信贷政策改变了延长时间。在最近的金融危机中,中央银行通过向银行提供不完全抵押贷款,并直接向非金融借款人贷款, 发起了“补偿中介的中止行动” (格特勒和清泷2010年,p.3)。此外,许多中央银行资本注入大型银行，目的是促进各经济部门的信贷流动。许多观察人士和政策制定者相信,这些干预措施促进了金融市场的稳定,因此,有助于限制了实际总体经济活动的放缓。Gertler et al(2010)。

Credit Policy In Business Cycle Analysis Economics Essay

Not long ago, the world has experienced one of the worst financial crises. The financial sector was injured; the global real economy slowed down and went into a severe recession, leading to a significant fall in real output. The crisis disrupted the financial intermediation mechanism and caused credit supply to the private sector to drop significantly. In many countries, fiscal and monetary authorities have put unconventional credit policies into practice, involving direct lending in credit markets to combat the crisis and reduce its macroeconomic spillovers.

Before the 2nd world war, the Federal Reserve abstained itself from intervening in the private sector lonable fund credit markets. These traditional credit policies have changed overtime. During the recent financial turmoil, central banks “acted to offset the disruption of intermediation” by supplying “imperfectly secured loans” to banks, and by lending directly to non- financial borrowers, Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010, p.3). Additionally, many central banks injected equity into large banks with the purpose of facilitating credit flows to various sectors of the economy. Numerous observers and policy makers believed that these interventions facilitated financial markets stabilization and as a result, helped limit the slowdown in real aggregate economic activity, Gertler et al (2010).

Gertler and Bernanke (1989) endogenized financial markets friction by presenting an agency problem between lenders and borrowers, (due to asymmetric information with regard to counterparties’ credit worthiness). This problem of agency brings about the trade-off between the opportunity cost of internal Finance (which increases the overall credit cost borrowers face) and of external finance. The external finance premium depends on the borrowers balance sheets’ conditions which vary across the business cycle. If an investment project’s outcome for borrowers increases, the borrower incentive to deviate from the lenders’ interest will decline. As a result, the external finance premium will decline. In times of recession, asset prices tend to decrease sharply, and the deterioration of borrowers’ balance sheets becomes inevitable; causing the premium of external finance to jump up (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). The impact of financial distress on the credit cost ultimately slows down real economic activity.

Gertler et al. (2010) argues that the disturbance of financial intermediation was the main characteristic of the recent financial crisis. Banks face significant difficulties in obtaining funds not only on wholesale financial markets, but also on interbank markets, (Gertler and Kiyotaki, 2010). In fact, the sharp decline in interbank market liquidity is usually one of the first signals that indicate a crisis is underway. When interbank markets operate efficiently, funds flow effectively in the banking system. In such