摘要:本文是一篇关于全职上诉机构的创建的留学生法律制度essay,作为2009年的经济危机产生的后果,政治领导人正越来越多地掩盖来自全球的竞争性市场国家在市场收缩的时间。截至2008年,153个成员国和30个观察国是世界贸易组织(WTO)的缔约国。
0. [17] The limited potential for cross-retaliation was provided in Article 22.3. [18]
The rules for amendments to the DSU are laid down in Article X.8 of the WTO agreement. Any amendment of the DSU requires a negative consensus and approval by the Ministerial Conference. The meaning of the term “consensus” is different to “unanimity”. Consensus means that no Member, present at the meeting, formally objects to the proposed decision. If a Member does not wish to support an amendment but do not have negative feelings about it either, that Member may abstain from a vote without inhibiting consensus.
On April 14, 1994, the Ministerial Decision adopted the “Application and Review of the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU review). The DSU review was to “complete a full review of dispute settlement rules and procedures” within four years, and “to take a decision on the occasion of its first meeting after the completion of the review, whether to continue, modify or terminate such dispute settlement rules and procedures”. [19]
Since 1998, negotiations to review and reform the DSU have taken place. They were informal negotiations that were supposed to conclude by the Seattle Third Ministerial Conference, in December 1999. At the time, the United States wanted to strengthen the enforcement quality of the system, by introducing carousal retaliation measures, opposing sequencing, and seeking shorter timelines. Being a “net complainant” in DSU practice, and having won in several cases (such as Canada–Magazines, EC–Bananas, EC–Hormones, or India–Patents), the US became worried that implementation of the decisions would be delayed. Over ambiguities in Articles 21.5 and 22 DSU, different proposals were submitted on sequencing which arose in EC–Bananas. The key question was whether a compliance panel review came before a complainant could retaliate. Carousel retaliation refers to periodic changes to the list of products that are subject to a suspension of concessions, in order to maximize the effect of the sanctions.
Additionally, the United States fought hard for increased external transparency and amicus curiae briefs. Regarding transparency, the US sought to make panel and Appellate Body submissions publicly available, and to make observance of panel and Appellate Body meetings public. Amicus curiae, or “friends of the court”, briefs are unsolicited reports from a private entity to the adjudicative body in order to support its decision-making. In the 1998 US–Shrimp/Turtle decision, the AB decided that the panel could accept unsolicited amicus curiae briefs. [20]
During informal consultations organized by Japan, the “Suzuki text”, was hammered out and submitted to the December 1999 Ministerial meeting in Seattle. The proposal did not gain sufficient support among Members, and it failed to take flight.
Following a number of losses on trade remedy cases, the US position in WTO dispute settlement changed from the offensive into the defensive. For Examples, in US–Foreign Sales Corporations, the US had lost and weakened their position on issues such as carousel retaliation or sequencing. After it had become clear that the US replacement legislation would not be in compliance with the recommendations of the DSB, the US and the EC negotiated a bilateral agreement. According to this agreement, a sequencing approach was adopted
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