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WTOinstitution ( Jackson, 1998:162).
This study seeks to examine the nexus between these two central developmentsin the current international economic system. In particular, it examines the effectsof trading blocs on the number of complaints filed in the GATT/WTO dispute
settlement system. In doing so, it first explores the economic effects of trading blocson third parties’ economies, and the political response of economic sectors andgovernments in third parties to these effects. This theoretical discussion highlightsthe initiation of a trade dispute as an appealing policy tool in the hands of thirdparty governments. Consequently, I hypothesize that states that form, deepen, and
widen trading blocs face an increasing number of complaints filed against them inthe GATT/WTO dispute settlement system. In order to test these hypotheses Iconduct a statistical analysis that examines the impact of three notable tradingblocsFnamely, the EU, North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), andMercado Comu´n del Sur (Mercosur)Fon the number of complaints filed againsttheir members in the GATT/WTO dispute settlement system.2 The empiricalanalysis supports the main arguments posed in the theoretical section.
This study contributes to three bodies of literature. First, in light of the growing
importance of the WTO and its dispute settlement system there is increasing
scholarly interest in this topic. The recent proliferation of International Relations
(IR) research on the politics of the GATT/WTO legal system reflects this interest
(see, e.g., Busch, 2000a; Goldstein and Martin, 2000; Reinhardt, 2000; Thompson,
2001; Busch and Reinhardt, 2002a). Although these studies shed light on
important dimensions of the multilateral legal system of international trade, they
overlook the possible impact of economic regionalism on this issue. This study aims
to fill this void.
Second, it contributes to IR literature on economic regionalism. Surprisingly,
scholars of international politics have paid little attention to the effects of trading
blocs on third parties and have focused almost exclusively on the effects of trading
blocs on their own members. The emphasis on intra-regional welfare can be traced
to theories such as Haas’s neofunctionalism and Deutsch’s studies of pluralist
security communities (Deutsch, Burrell, Kann, Lee, Lichterman, Lindgern,
Loewenheim, and Van Wagenen, 1957; Haas, 1964). These theories, which were
inspired by the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and
the European Economic Community (EEC),3 viewed trading blocs as a vehicle
toward economic and political cooperation between the bloc’s members. Extant
research on this topic continues to emphasize the benign effects of trading blocs on
economic prosperity and international security (see, e.g., Caporaso, 1998;
Mansfield and Pevehouse, 2000). Studies that consider the effects of trading blocs
on third parties are few and far between (Oye, 1992; Mansfield, 1998; Mattli, 1999).
These studies, which form a springboard for this article, overlook, however, the
possible effects of economic regionalism on the multilateral trade institutions. My
analysis endeavors to advance this research agenda.

 

References
BAGWELL, K., AND R. W. STAIGER (1997) Multilateral Tariff Cooperation during the Formation of
Customs Unions. Journal of International Economics 42:91–112.
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