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of capital, high costs of financial intermediation, and lower rates of return to savers, it is theoretically clear that financial repression inhibits growth (Roubini and Sala-i-Martin, 1992). The empirical findings on the effect of removing financial repression, i.e., financial liberalization on growth supports this view, but various channels through which liberalization spurs growth have been evidenced.

The possible negative effect of financial repression on economic growth does not automatically mean that countries should adopt a laissez-faire stance on financial development and remove all regulations and controls that create financial repression. Many developing countries that liberalized their financial markets experienced crises partly because of the external shocks that financial liberalization introduces or amplifies.

Financial liberalization can create short-term volatility despite its long-term gains (Kaminsky and Schmukler, 2002). Also, because of market imperfections and information asymmetries, removing all public financial regulations may not yield an optimal environment for financial development. An alternative to a financially repressive administration would be a new set of regulations to ensure market competition as well as prudential regulation and supervision.

ECONOMIC THOUGHTS
The literature on finance and development postulates a symbiotic relationship between the evolution of the financial system and the development of the real economy. This prediction is common to both the McKinnon-Shaw approach and the endogenous growth literature. However, while in the former financial development determines the level of steady-state output, in the latter it is a determinant of the equilibrium rate of economic growth.

In the McKinnon-Shaw literature the basis for the relationship between financial and economic development is Gurley and Shaw's (1955) debt-intermediation hypothesis. In this framework an increase in financial saving relative to the level of real economic activity increases the extent of financial intermediation and raises productive investment which, in turn, raises per-capita income. In these models nominal interest rate controls inhibit capital accumulation because they reduce the real rate of return on bank deposits, thereby discouraging financial saving. Moreover, higher reserve requirements also exert a negative influence on financial intermediation by increasing the wedge between lending and deposit rates. Under a competitive banking system this wedge is an increasing function of the rate of inflation. Thus higher real interest rates encourage capital accumulation and real economic activity, largely through an increase in the extent of financial intermediation.

The competitive model of the banking industry are theoretically inadequate because First, in many less developed countries the banking industry is typically dominated by a small number of banks and collusive behaviour is not uncommon. Second, asymmetric information in loan markets is sufficient to generate a considerable degree of market power for lenders.

Theoretical inadequacy relates to the implication of the assumptions of perfect competition, which leave little room for analyzing the behaviour of banks and their reactions to government interventions. Departure of the benchmark model from perfect competition has important implications for the way in whic