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ation with the condition of it having an African character and operational-level decisions being managed jointly. On June 22 the AU Peace and Security Council authorised such mission and on July 31 UNSC resolution 1769 mandated UNAMID. In the following months Khartoum expelled the country director of humanitarian organization CARE, which, summed to many earlier explusions of people from the country alerted the international community that Sudan's 'tough stance vis-a-vis the international community' (SEcurityCOuncilreport.org) would continue. Towards the end of the year, it became clear that the exclusively 'African character' of the operation was an obstacle to the implementation of its mandate. In December the GoS was reluctant to accept the contribution by non-African countries of needed resources, which, according to UN Under Secretary-General Jean-Marie Guéhenno, would assure 'an early display of robustness.'

Resolution 1769

UNSC Resolution 1769 of July 31, 2007 calls upon the commitment made by the GoS in high level consultations with the AU and UN in Addis Ababa in June, 2007 to allow the creation of a hybrid AU/UN mission in Darfur. It also recalls the condition, stated in the Addis Ababa Agreement that 'the Hybrid operation should have a predominantly African Character and the troops should, as far as possible, be sourced from African countries.' (S/res/1769)The operation approved in the aforementioned resolution was officially called the African Union-United Nations hybrid operation in Darfur (UNAMID). Resolution 1769 decided UNAMID was to establish operational capability by October 2007 and complete preparations to assume operational command authority over Light Support Package, -'designed to assist AMIS in the establishment of an integrated command and control structure and to increase the effectiveness and coordination of its operations' (S/2007/307)- personnel deployed to AMIS, and such Heavy Support Package -'composed of military, police and mission support personnel and equipment, as well as civilian staff to provide support in a range of areas' (Ibid)- and hybrid personnel as may be deployed by that date. By December 31, 2007 UNAMID had to assume authority from AMIS. The resolution also calls for a report from the Secretary General on UNAMID and the general situation in Darfur no later than 90 days after the approval of the resolution.

Structure

Resolution 1769 authorizes the deployment of UNAMID for an initial 12 months. UNAMID was to incorporate the AMIS personnel and be formed by 'up to 19, 555 military personnel including 360 military observers and liasion officers, and an appropriate civilian component including up to 3,772 police personnel and 19 formed police units comprising up to 140 personnel each.' (S/res/1769 2007) The mechanism to manage the hybrid mission works as follows: There is a single change of command, whose structure was 'provided by the United Nations,' (S/RES/1769 2007) but there is a special reporting mechanism through which the AU is set to receive a constant inflow of information. A joint Special Representative, Rodolphe Adada, a joint force commander, Martin Agwai, a deputy to the Joint Special Representative, and a Police Commissioner were jointly appointed. The Joint Special Representative has to report both to the AU Commissioner for Peace and the UN Deputy Secretary General for Peacekeeping operat