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he ownership of eachenterprise was split into (1) state share; (2) legal persons shares and (3) common domestic
A-shares. After the opening of two stock exchanges in the beginning of 1990s, with only asmall fraction of A-shares are tradable, the state keeps on holding the controlling sharestakes. This is different from both advanced and other transition economies, explains large
part of the inefficiency of corporate governance of China listed companies. This specialinstitutional arrangement rooted deeply in China political system and ideology, as well asin the economic reform strategy.
After a description of the corporate governance and shareholding structure of Chinalisted companies in Section 2; an in-depth historical and institutional analysis of theformation of state-owned share given in Section 3; Section 4 then reviews an importantreform attempt of 2001, through which the government tried to resell its illiquid sharesgradually. The reform arose dramatic market turbulence, lasting https://www.51lunwen.org/Brisbane/2011/0715/1507038279.htmlfor less than half a yearand then called off, because the government’s objective, aiming to finance its huge socialsecurity fund gap, conflicts with that of market; Section 5 makes some concluding remarks.
2. Corporate governance and share structure
2.1. The role of PLCs in Chinese economy

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