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 论文编号：
org200812011335365798 |
| 论文属性：
thesis |
| 论文语言：English |
| 论文国家：USA |
| 登出日期： 2008-12-01 |
| 字数： 6000 |
| 源程序：
无 |
| 价格：
300 |
| 注明： |
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| 论文大纲，目录 |
| 关键词搜索：Cross-Listing Corporate Governance |
In their seminal survey of corporate governance, Shleifer and Vishny distill the issue into a blunt question: “How do [the suppliers of finance] make sure that managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects?”1 The Enron/Arthur Andersen debacle and the ensuing waves of scandal vividly proved that American investors may face this question in the most acute form. Yet even today, many would argue that in a global comparison, American securities markets provide public investors with a more hospitable and protective environment than most other markets around the world. American markets still fare better in terms of the legal rules governing them, the legal professionals that work to enforce the regime, and a sophisticated court system that provides the necessary infrastructure for a well-functioning corporate governance system. The 2002 wave of scandal tarnished the reputation of the American market,2 but has not eroded it completely.英语论文网 【http://www.51lunwen.org】
本文来自：英语论文网 【http://www.51lunwen.org】 |
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