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under which a panel would review the implementation of the replacement legislation, and the appropriate level of sanctions should the replacement legislation be found inconsistent with the WTO. The US had now become a beneficiary of the sequencing approach which it had opposed before.

In 2001, in the Fourth Ministerial Conference, the Doha Ministerial Declaration dedicated Members to negotiate on improvements to and clarifications of the DSU. An agreement was to be reached by May 2003. [21] Formal and informal discussions of conceptual proposals put forward by Members were held under the support of the Special Negotiating Session of the DSB. In total, 42 independent proposals had been submitted by the end of the negotiations.

A number of the less controversial proposals were integrated into a compromise text, the Balás text.21 It contained amendments to all stages of the DSU process, including enhanced third party rights, a new procedure for sequencing ambiguity in Articles 21.5 and 22 of the DSU, enhanced compensation, and the introduction of an interim review into the appellate stage, The compromise text also contained several provisions on the special and differential treatment of developing countries and a remand procedure in which an issue may be remanded to the original panel.

But, in the end, the deadline for the end of May 2003 was missed, and was extended until the end of May 2004. When the May 2004 deadline was missed yet again, the chairman established a brief report, suggesting the continuation of the negotiations without any new target date.22 The chairman’s recommendation was adopted by the General Council on August 1, 2004. Although unsuccessful so far, the DSU review negotiations have presented a remarkable variety of proposals in the last 12 years.

III analysis of dsu proposals – TOWARDS negotiator or judge?

The overall direction and role the adjudication in the WTO will be shaped by the DSU proposals and adoptions. The dispute settlement system could continue its ever-converging path with rule-orientation and adjudication, or it could return to a more diplomatic approach? [22] There have been a plethora of proposals that serve to strengthen the role of the DSU as an adjudicator, further pushing into the realm of rule maker, in some minds policy maker, and further from the ideals of a WTO forum of trade. Among these proposals are: the reduction of timelines in throughout the process; the review of mutually acceptable solutions (MASs); the creation of a permanent panel body (PPB) and full-time AB; unambiguous procedures in sequencing, retaliation, and post-retaliation; increasing enforcement powers of the DSB; strengthening third party (TP) rights; and increasing transparency.

Rule-Orienting Mutually Acceptable Solutions

Japan25 and some developing countries26 have proposed a more strict wording of the notification requirement in Article 3.6 of the DSU. Disputing parties would be required to notify MASs to the DSB. Jamaica proposed the submission of a factual and concise written report about the outcomes of the consultations phase to the DSB.27 Therefore, MASs and consultations subject-matter would have to be reported to the DSB. These proposals would strengthen transparency, and increase third party power. Adequate MAS notifications can ensure that MASs are in full conformity with WTO disciplines, via normative and p