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e 2 in relation to the dimensions of theory, methodology and change suggests an inevitable partiality in understanding. There are no comprehensive approaches to understanding the empirical world. This is well understood by the approaches coming from Kantian origins. However, those of Comtean thought are less convinced of this relativity in the understanding process. With their unquestioning amalgamation of the rationalists’ and empiricists’ traditions they also readily transferred the belief in absolute truth which was so much a part of the former schools of thought. What is clear from multiple critiques of this claim to absolute truth (see for instance Bernstein, 1979, 1983, and Habermas, 1978, for typical examples) is that it is untenable. Despite the claim to the contrary and the continuing public esteem given to these schools of thought they do not generate some absolute and complete picture of reality. The insights generated through these Comtean derivatives are as partial and incomplete as any of the other more “subjective” approaches. What is still surprising, as an aside, is the continuing esteem given to these approaches which may not be unconnected with our human desire for certainty and a fascination with something which makes claims to absolute truth. However, this is something for the sociologists of knowledge to consider and will not be pursued further in this article. Choices are contestable, as are the criteria which drive them, with possibly the most vulnerable being either the criterion that appeals to accuracy of representation or the choice which unquestioningly tries to amalgamate all approaches. The notion of representation of reality is highly problematic. In the thinking of both Fichte and Nietzsche, as we have already seen, the very concept of representation is uncertain, because of its ontological assumption ofan independent existence of reality distinct from observers’ projections, making it a dubious basis for choice. To use this as a choice criterion is, in fact, a privileging of Comtean and certain Hegelian alternatives which pride themselves on their representational accuracy. An alternative criterion for choice is not to have to make a choice at all but rather call for a simple amalgamation of all the alternatives. This too, however, is not a satisfactory solution to the choice problem due to the mutually exclusive nature of these alternatives. The very existence of the great divides in the schools of thought depicted in the previous section suggests such a simple amalgamation is not possible. This is not to say that a range of scholars have not tried to achieve this. Notable among these have been Weber and more recently Giddens, yet a closer look at either of these specific approaches suggests some subtle rejection of key concerns (see, for instance, Bernstein’s, 1986 interesting critique of Giddens’ claim to be critical of the status quo in this regard). Thus, arguably, neither of these routes provides an easy or obvious solution to the problem of choice. While any criterion is bound to be problematic the following suggests the need for a discursive argument for a particular position on the three continuums (which will lead to focusing on one of the many alternative approaches that are available) as the way forward if a researcher does want to defend his/her position and convince others in the academic community of its worth. At one level this privileges Habermasian critical theory, which is built on th