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 论文编号：
org200808220933464462 |
| 论文属性：
学术论文 |
| 论文语言：English |
| 论文国家：U.K. |
| 登出日期： 2008-08-22 |
| 字数： 3800 |
| 源程序：
无 |
| 价格：
50 |
| 参考相关附件： |
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| 论文大纲，目录 |
| 关键词搜索：Monetary Policy Reserve |
Over the past decade, the level of required
reserve balances held by depository
institutions in the United States has
declined dramatically. Indeed, most depository
institutions can now meet reserve requirements
by holding vault cash rather than by maintaining
balances at the Federal Reserve. Part of this
decrease resulted from the Federal Reserve’s
decision to reduce reserve requirements in 1990
and 1992 to reduce bank costs and stimulate
lending. More recently, depository institutions
have been able to cut required balances even
further by sweeping funds from reservable to
nonreservable accounts, circumventing reserve
requirement regulations.
The decline in reserve balances has fueled a
debate over the role of reserve requirements. On
the one hand, proponents of reserve requirements
argue that low reserve balances may complicate
monetary policy operations and increase shortterm
interest rate volatility. Thus, they advocate
the Federal Reserve take actions to stop the
continuing erosion of reserve balances. On the
other hand, critics of reserve requirements argue
that lower reserve requirements remove a distortionary
tax on depository institutions and need
not complicate monetary policy operations.
In a previous article, we provided an analytical
framework for thinking about these issues
(Sellon and Weiner). That article suggested that
monetary policy can be conducted英语论文网 【http://www.51lunwen.org】 in a world of
low or zero reserve requirements as long as there
continues to be a demand for central bank balances.
Such demand is likely to arise from the
need of financial institutions to hold central
bank balances for settlement purposes and to
transact business with the government. The demand
for settlement balances is likely to be behaviorally
different from the demand for reserves, however,
leading to two potential problems for monetary
policy operations. First, because the demand for
central bank balances arises from payments needs
rather than from a mandated linkage to deposit
liabilities, the structure of the payments system
becomes an important factor in the design and
implementation of monetary policy operating
procedures. Consequently, changes in the payments
system may affect the demand for settlement
balances and complicate monetary policy.
Gordon H. Sellon, Jr. is an assistant vice president and
economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Stuart E. Weiner is a vice president and economist at the
bank. The authors would like to thank Roger Clews, Kevin
Clinton, and Michael Reddell for helpful discussions in
the course of the preparation of this article. Stephen
Monto, an assistant economist at the bank, helped prepare
the article. The views expressed herein are solely those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas Ci
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