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e is a case of what Hecksher-Ohlin argues: ‘’constant returns to scale’’ as mentioned in the end of the PART I. As the Commission Communication indicates, open markets are a must for the competitiveness of the EU and its businesses (COM 2006, No 566).

But what is the EU’s global political target behind this economic indicators scene? I would draw on the Meunier & Nicolaidis (2006) conceptions of ‘’power in trade’’ and ‘’power through trade’’, and then bringing the element of respectively ‘’market access’’ and ‘’services’’ in Doha Development Agenda (DDA), and then confirm these scholars’ formulations. The basic argument is that EU’s internal market size, and also the share in world trade are its key sources of global trade power, which are deliberately used by the EU to secure asymmetrical market access concessions from others (p.908). They say, the use of trade to achieve non-trade objectives has pride of place as a potential instrument of Europe’s geopolitical power (p.912) because the EU as a heavily relies on non-military means, which is essentially trade. The Union implements it in two forms: (1) power in trade, whereby access to the EU’s market is simply traded for increased exports of the EU’s own goods, capital and services (p.910) asymmetrically for the benefit of the EU; and (2) power through trade, whereby it exports its internal mode of governance to its external relations. Now, I substantiate these formulations as follows.

The DDA issues: (a) market access for agricultural and non-agricultural products;

(b) elimination of subsidies; and (c) services. For (a) the DDA sets the elimination of tariffs for agricultural products for all WTO members. The EU, despite its asymmetrically preferential access to most of the member countries agriculture product markets, responds to this requirement as the first formulation assumes – rather than a package tariff reduction, the EU requires incremental and product-selective reductions. On the other hand, for market access to industrial goods the EU almost does not demonstrate hard stance: it admits the protectionist measures to be applied by other WTO members meanwhile herself, together with the other developed member countries has advantageous accesses to big developing WTO member state markets. The EU’s import and export indicators in the global industrial products trade are indicated above in detail – EU is the largest possessor. As for agricultural export subsidies, the EU agrees on petty offers such as the reduction of subsidies on some selective products that each LDC would wish but keenly closes doors for further liberalizations unless these LDCs and other developing countries give her a larger market access. For the second formulation above, the services issue is remarkable. The Union absolutely does not oppose further liberalization of services under WTO because it is the largest exporter of services (this element also pertains to the logic of first formulation) and it has already liberalized internally to a large degree the services like financial and telecommunications: ‘’exporting its single market rules to other contexts’’ (p.914). This case shows that current DDA policy of the EU significantly serves for its target to become a global power through the back door, by leveraging its (substantial) trade power (p. 922). Therefore, I conclude that the underlying reason for the EU’s active engagement in the global trade liberalization