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t that it is seen to become, by mutual consent, a matter for elites.
 
The shift from national to European governance, as argued by researchers, has lead to what is dubbed, a type of co-ordinated decentralisation. Furthermore, by changing the traditional method of decision making to accentuate the process itself over the institution, some have referred to the surfacing of a 'Faustian bargain'. A paramount example of this argument lies in the consensus nature of methods currently undertaken in the Council. Thus, for the sake of a broader agreement, accountability and effectiveness is limited. This creates great compromise between institutions within the union due to the informal nature of the decision making ultimately widening the gap between citizens and their representatives in the EU.
 
The type of multi-level governance practiced by the European Union is characterised by a technocratic system that includes transnational, national and sub-national institutions, and a wide variety of public and private actors. Negotiations and networks among the multi-level institutions are defined more by informal, behind the scenes relationships. Here relations are not hierarchically defined, but rather contextualised both at the vertical and horizontal levels. Rather than complementing or expanding on inter-governmental practices, the multi-level arrangement often deals directly with sub-national or local authorities. Some point to the effectiveness of separating the central, regional and local authorities into autonomous bodies, capable of creating autonomous linkages directly with the transnational institutions of the EU.
 
Yet these types of institutional networks have a way of allowing more powerful stakeholders to succeed over smaller, often less experienced and resourced agents. This is due to the lack of formal structure inherent in the negotiations among EU institutions and regional or local actors. With so many actors and institutions contributing to the EU process of policymaking, it becomes difficult to hold any one player accountable.
 
Internal solutions to combat criticism over the lack of democratic practice within EU institutions have failed to overcome the deficit, or address the underlying root causes. This was demonstrated by the recent appointment of a new Commissioner to deal with external communication issues. Aside from the fact that the new Commissioner was in fact an old commissioner, simply reassigned or re-commissioned, her main focus of attention in engaging the public sector centred on creating a dialogue or brainstorming with civic groups. This, it is inferred, would create the necessary link with the disgruntled and disconnected European citizens.
 
Yet, in common with many of the consulting firms and lobbying associations set up to influence policy in Brussels, many of these civic groups were directly financed largely by the commission. As one commentator points out, the Commission financially supports many organisations:
 
[...] partly because they are convenient interlocutors for the various policymaking directorates. Suppose the environment or social-affairs directorates are thinking of issuing new directives and want to be seen to take account of the views of European citizens. What could be easier that picking up the phone and arranging a meeting with the local (Commission-funded) NGO?
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