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c use condition. The Supreme Court held that the city created a plan that would benefit the public and that showed no preference to any “specific individuals”. Justice Kennedy joined in the majority opinion and wrote a separate concurrence. Justice O'Connor, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote the dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas also wrote a separate dissent (United States Congress, 2005).

From Justice Kennedy's point of view the courts have to examine economic development takings more closely than other takings to determine whether or not the taking is in the best interests of the public or favors the benefit of private individuals. Kennedy thought that the Courts can do this without the presumption that the government executed eminent domain with malevolent intentions. Kennedy was content that the trial court in this case concluded its verdict after closely investigative the takings and discarded the argument that the city was acting only to benefit specific private interests (United States Congress, 2005).

In Justice Thomas' separate dissent from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist, he stated that the Fifth Amendment permit the government to take property only if the government plans to possess the property or literally allow it for public use. He recommended the Court to reassess its decisions based on the takings clause's historical context. He stated that the founding fathers viewed “public use” and “public welfare” to express different meanings. He argued that, over time, the courts have moved away from the literal meaning of public use and moved toward the more modern and broad term of public welfare. Like O'Connor, Thomas wrote that the Kelo verdict of the Court “rendered the takings clause meaningless by substituting “public purpose” for the Constitution's “public use” language.” (United States Congress, 2005)

The main dissent was from Justices O'Connor and Scalia, and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Writing the dissent, Justice O'Connor stated that the takings clause's “public use” conditions were violated the interpretation of an economic development takings. In agreement with Justice Thomas, Justice O'Connor had a literal interpretation. She abandoned the majority's opinion that the Constitution permits the relocation of private property to private developers as long as the public gains some incidental benefit. Justice O'Connor argued that it was not in the legislation's power to decide if the use of eminent domain was unconstitutional; that is a power strictly reserved for the judiciary. O'Connor cited from two preceding cases, Berman v. Parker (1954) and Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff (1984) as the basis of her argument. She made note of the fact that the takings in these cases were not for economic improvements but for removing element of harm: blight in Berman and land oligopoly in Midkiff. She stated that in upholding the Kelo takings,

In oral arguments between the Court and Scott G. Bullock, the lead counsel for the defense of the Kelo plaintiffs, the issue of what standard eminent domain should function under was addressed. Justice O'Connor continued her stance that the Court's interpretation of eminent domain followed the constitutionally set guidelines. The transcript of the oral argument concerning the state of emient domain's interpretation reads as follows:

Scott G. Bullock's oral arg