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for stakeholder theory?
To begin with, our analysis suggests that .stakeholder theory does not necessarily
involve the kind of radical transformations of current legal relationships
thai some of its advocates and critics might assume. That is, meeting fiduciary
duties to shareholders does not entail that managers must side with shareholders
and against stakeholders, Firms have the legal autonomy to act proactively and
advance the interests of a number of stakeholders simultaneously. Managers and
organizations have considerable latitude in defining core values and philosophy.
288 BUSINESS ETHICS QUARTERLY
including exactly what kind of responsibilities it wishes to assume with respect
to a wide array of stakeholders. Managers are also free to exercise a wide latitude
regarding the kinds of investments they wish to make and the way they
evaluate alternative uses of corporate resources. So, while stakeholder theory
may sound radical to our colleagues in finance, Economics, and strategy, it is
well within the boundaries of the law, and particularly with respect to the fiduciary
duties owed to shareholders (see also Donaldson and Preston, 1995).
Managers will still face some tough decisions about how to aliocate resources
and which priorities to establish among stakeholder ciaims. However, this anaiysis
suggests that these are, for the most part, moral choices which the law gives
managers discretion to make without fear of violating their fiduciary duties to
sharehoiders, and thus, not having to make whoiesale choices between stakeholders
and sharehoiders. Thus, researchers would do weii to get beyond the
stakeholder paradox, spend less time worrying about fiduciary duties as a significant
impediment to stakeholder theory, and refocus inquiry in ways that avoid
this conceptual roadblock.
A second and related point is that despite its aspirations to managerial relevance
(Donaldson and Preston, 1995). stakeholder theorists have, for the most
part, avoided this challenge. Applying the collective wisdom of several of the
premier works in this domain (e.g., Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Evan and
Freeman, 1983) offers managers little concrete direction as to how to allocate
resources, make decisions, and sort out the legitimacy and importance of various
stakehoider ciaims. Indeed, we suspect that one reason for the emergence of
the stakehoider paradox is the generality and relative ambiguity of stakeholder
theory. Without more direction and specific guidance on its implications, theorists
are free to suppose there exists considerable conflict between stakeholders
and shareholders. Developing more specific and managerially directive forms
of stakeholder theory, we maintain, would not only improve its managerial relevance,
but provide further support for our claims about the stakeholder paradox.
Thus, we suggest that isolating distinct and clearly practicable approaches to
managing corporations provides a potent new method for advancing stakeholder
theory and helping to extend its influence beyond the walls of the academy. As
part of this task, researchers should engage both fellow theorists and managers
in dialogue to convince them ofthe efficacy and persuasiveness of stakeholderoriented
management approaches—in both their instrumental and normative
dimensions. Doing so need not set up unrealistic expectations of theorists