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strategic interests, the survival ability of the merged entity, the change of the target company and so on. It is clearly showed that theory is only an auxiliary method in the regulation of merger policy. Many uncertainties mean the theories are only References.

Airtours is a surviver in the case though Airtours may not get so much immediate benefits from the victory in the appeal. But the result may have much more significance beyond the case itself. The ECC has clarified the test for collective dominance to some extent to avoid future fault. Cases alike in the future will be more predictable. The commission itself will get a more clear view of judgement on the merger cases. The case of airtours steadyed the need for the introduction of more transparent and accountable decisions made by the ECC. The commission itself would get much experience in the case to utilize in the future revolution. 

 

References:
CRA Competition Memo. 1999. The Airtours Case [Online].
CRA Competition Memo Available at: CRA Competition Memo. 2002. After the Airtours Appeal [Online].
CRA Competition Memo Available at: European Commission. 1999. Merger decision. [Online].
European Commission Available at: Ivaldi, M., Jullien, B., Rey, P., Seabright, P., Tirole, J., 2003. The Economics of Tacit Collusion, Report for DG Comp, European Commission.

Lyons, B. (ed.), 2009. Cases in European Competition Policy, Ch14 - Collective dominance

Marc, I. et al., 2003. The Economics of Unilateral Effects. Ch. 1 esp. pp. 17-20Available  at: https://www.51lunwen.org/mbaessay/ [accessed 27 April 2011]

Motta, M., 2004. Competition Policy: Theory and Practise. Ch 5.

RBB Brief 02. 2002. Airtours/First Choice : CFI Holds Commission to Account .
RBB Brief 02 [Online]. Available at:  

 

 

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