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美国大公司不是由它们的主人，设置了开拓性的研究的基石调查所有权与经营权的分离。他们建议，在一个分散的股权设置中的代理问题，提出了管理层和股东之间有冲突时，他们的利益和不同的目标。低股权集中度会大大削弱股东的监测能力，并提供了一个机会，经理尝试开展项目，最大限度地提高他们的私人利益，不提损害股东的利益。
The pioneering study of Berle and Means (1932), which was the first to explore that large American corporations had not run by their owners, set a cornerstone of investigating into the separation of ownership and management. They suggest that agency problems, in a dispersed ownership setup, come up between management and shareholders when they have conflicts of interest and differing goals. Low ownership concentration may highly weaken monitoring capacity of shareholder, and provide an opportunity that managers try to carry out projects that maximise their private benefits which may not in the interest of the shareholders. 
然而，Berle和Means的结果的意义仍然没有持续到很长一段时间，直到Jensen和Meckling（1976）开发的“企业理论”，从而明确所有权和控制权的分散的影响建模。他们认为，一个公司应该增加其所有权的集中，降低代理成本。此外，Grossman和Hart（1980）认为，代理问题与股权集中度下降，由于搭便车问题变得更糟。从那时起，越来越多的研究人员正在对这个问题感兴趣。
However, the significance of the findings of Berle and Means remained almost was not been noticed for a long time until Jensen and Meckling (1976) developed their “theory of the firm”, and thereby expressly modelled the effects of the dispersion of ownership and control. They suggest that a corporation should increase its ownership concentration to reduce the agency costs. Furthermore, Grossman and Hart (1980) believe that the agency problems gets even worse with decreasing ownership concentration owing to the free rider problem. Since then, more and more researchers are interested on that issue. 
Some researchers, later, identify potential advantages and disadvantages resulting from concentrated ownership. One advantage is that large shareholders with sufficiently large ownership stakes have the incentive to monitor the management for theirs and other shareholders’ benefits, because they aligned with the interests of the corporation (Shleifer and Vishny 1986; Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003). In other words, large shareholders have the ability to ‘address the agency problem in that they have both a general interest in profit maximisation, and enough control over the assets of the firm to have their interest respected’ (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).
The problem linked to concentrated ownership is large shareholders (block holdings), could engage in activities and force the firm to take actions that benefit themselves at the expense of minority shareholders or any other participants (Shleifer and Vishny 1997; Holderness 2003). Shleifer and Vishny (1997) mention that ‘As ownership gets beyond a certain point, large owners gain nearly full control of the company and are wealthy enough to prefer to use firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority shareholders’.
Literature Review
Ambiguous Relationships and Conflicting Results
As has been mentioned, the potential advantages and problems of concentrated ownership bring about two opposing theoretical predictions. On one hand, there is a positive influence of ownership concentration on firm performance because of reducing agency costs. On the other hand, missed financing opportunities and high private benefits of blockholders might cause a negative relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance. Basing on these predictions, an optimised ownership concentration should located in the midd本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。