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摘要：At last, some suggestions based on the problems and important issues of China’s financial supervision are proposed to help the further development of China’s financial supervisory system.

he further development of China’s supervisory system 41
5.1 Strengthen coordination between regulatory agencies 41
5.2 Improve the financial legal system to provide a strong legal protection 42
5.3 Create the conditions of unified supervision based on current separate supervisory system 43
Chapter 6: Conclusion 45
Reference 46
List of figures
Figure 1 the structure of China’s financial supervisors 17
Figure 2 the trends of China's 1998-2008 financial deepening rates 26
Figure 3 The trend of China's 1998-2008 Securitization Ratio 28
Figure 4 the trend of China's 1998-2008 insurance depth 30
List of tables
Table 1 China's 1998-2008 financial deepening rates 25
Table 2 China's 1998-2008 Securitization Ratio 27
Tabl 3 China's 1998-2008 insurance depth 29

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