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ise in the collection and processing of information. In our model, banks compete for borrowers in a three stage process. Upon entering a loan market intermediaries invest in relationship building technology that generates borrower specie information. They then decide whether to build amending relationship with borrowers who are located around them. In order to capture the varying degrees of informational expertise and relationship building present in modern banking we take the information generation success to be a function of the informational distance between bank and borrower. The closer a borrower is located to a bank in informational distance the more informative the relationship becomes and the better a bank can assess a borrower's credit worthiness. Given the location-dependent screening and relationship building choice, banks o err a particular type of loan and interest rate to borrowers who then choose the bank with the best quote.

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