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1. Introduction
1.1 Background
Recently, whether in international or domestic, every year some well-known listed companies broke the event of fraud. From the point of view of many cases of financial fraud in the market, many of them are attributed to the imperfect agency mechanism (Weil, 2004). The agency problem between shareholders and creditors, shareholders and management, makes the regulatory system in theoretic layers become weak, and supervisors do not want to fulfill their supervisory duties, and supervised people are more unscrupulous to maximize their own interests and finally gradually changes into a corrupt fraud.
As we all know, property rights are the foundation of corporate governance issues, agency is the basic system of governance, and imperfect contract management is the reason for governance, as the ultimate goal of governance is to reduce agency costs, making the company's organizational structure to more effectively apply in the modern market (Ayres et al., 2007).

Table of contents
1. Introduction 3
1.1 Background 3
1.2 Research objective 4
2. Literature review 4
3. Case study - fraud case in Tyco International Ltd 5
4.1 Company profile 5
4.2 Fraud case 6
4.3 Cause analysis of fraud 7
4.3.1 The agency problem between shareholders and management 7
4.3.2 The agency problem between creditors and shareholders 8
5. Conclusions and recommendations 9
References 9

References
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Sorkin, A.R. (2003). “Tyco’s Ex-Chief Going to Court In’Greed Case’”. The本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。