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es of board and ownership structures explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in the total CEO compensation, which is the sum of cash and equity-based compensation, after controlling for other firm-specific variables. We provide evidence that firms with boards that are larger in size and have a higher proportion of non-executive directors on their boards pay their CEOs higher compensation, suggesting that non-executive
1
ONS (Office for National Statistics)’s report 2004.
2
A recent study by Hartzell and Starks (2003) finds a significantly negative relation between the concentration of
institutional ownership and the level of executive compensation for a sample of US companies. Their result suggests that
in the US institutions serve a monitoring role in mitigating the agency problem between shareholders and managers.
3
See, for example, Core et al. (1999).Do corporate governance mechanisms influence
CEO compensation? An empirical
investigation of UK companies
Neslihan Ozkan
 
University of Bristol, UK
Received 13 September 2005; accepted 9 August 2006
Available online 2 October 2006

Abstract
The aim of this paper is to empirically examine the influence of corporate governance mechanisms, that is, ownership and board structure of companies, on the level of CEO compensation for a sample of 414 large UK companies for the fiscal year 2003/2004. The results show that measures of board and ownership structures explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in the total CEO compensation, which is the sum of cash and equity-based compensation, after controlling other firm characteristics.https://www.51lunwen.org/liuxuelunwendx/ We find that firms with larger board size and a higher proportion of non-executive directors on their boards pay their CEOs higher compensation, suggesting that non-executive directors are not more efficient in monitoring than executive directors. We also find that institutional ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant and negative impact on CEO compensation. Our results are consistent with the existence of active monitoring by block-holders and institutional shareholders. Finally, the results show that CEO compensation is lower when the directors’ ownership is higher.
  2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
JEL classification: G3
Keywords: CEO compensation; Corporate Governance
1. Introduction
CEO compensation packages have been a focus of much academic and media interest. One important question is whether corporate governance mechanisms can play a significant role in
 
Tel.: +44 117 9288439; fax: +44 117 928 8577.
E-mail address: N.ozkan@bristol.ac.uk.
1042-444X/$ – see front matter   2006 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.mulfin.2006.08.002N. Ozkan / J. of Multi. Fin. Manag. 17 (2007) 349–364 351
directors are not more efficient in monitoring than executive directors. Moreover, our results show that institutional ownership and block-holder ownership have a significant and negative impact on the level of total CEO and cash compensation, which suggests the existence of active monitoring by block-holders and institutional shareholders. However, equity-based compensation does not seem to be influenced significantly by institutional ownership, while block-holder ownership has a negative and significant impact on equity-based compensation. Additionally, w本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。