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private costs and benefits of voluntary reporting and disclosure choices and, in this sense, provide a micro foundation. However, these studies provide few insights into the overall desirability, economic efficiency or aggregate outcomes of reporting and disclosure regulation. On the other hand, there has been a recent flurry of studies examining international differences in the effects of different regulatory regimes and on the economic consequences of regulatory changes, such as Regulation Fair Disclosure and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. We synthesize the insights of these studies in our survey. However, there are still many unanswered questions, especially, (i) why disclosure regulation is so pervasive; (ii) the dynamics and (iii) the process of regulation; (iv) the real and macro-economic consequences of disclosure regulation, (v) its complementarities with other regulations, (vi) its Survey papers that review the disclosure literature or the information/asset pricing literatures include Healy and Palepu (2001), Core (2001), Amihud, Mendelson and Pedersen (2005), and Botosan (2006). Our review complements these surveys by highlighting recent research on the regulation of firms‟ financial reporting and disclosure activities. In addition, our review includes numerous new research studies that post-date prior surveys. 3 These recent advances are an impetus for our survey and are reviewed in detail.

optimal form given imperfect enforcement; and (vii) the issue of regulatory competition. We discuss these open questions and conclude our survey with suggestions for future research in these areas. Despite the focus on regulation, this paper should not be understood as advocating the necessity of regulation or reforms to existing regulations. In fact, we highlight the importance of market forces in influencing firms‟ disclosure and reporting choices, both in isolation as well as the interactions with regulatory acts. For instance, we highlight that corporate transparency likely is a joint outcome of market forces and the incentives provided by various rules and regulations (including the quality of their enforcement). We also point to significant complementarities between the elements of a country‟s institutional infrastructure. Given these complementarities, we highlight that unilateral changes in disclosure and accounting rules are unlikely to yield the desired outcomes. Similarly, we stress that global diversity in institutional and economic factors may limit the effectiveness of a “one-size-fits-all” set of global accounting standards and disclosure regulations. Finally, we emphasize that the issue of firms‟ avoidance strategies, which have long been known to seriously impair the effectiveness of regulation, is further compounded by the growing integration of capital markets around the world, which provides firms with alternatives outside their home countries and leads to regulatory competition. Our survey touches issues that are discussed in the economics literature on regulation in general, such as political lobbying and regulatory capture. However, this literature often focuses on the regulation of product-market monopolists and the corresponding impact on consumers (see, e.g., Kahn, 1988; Laffont and Tirole, 1993). Disclosure settings have their own unique economic and regulatory issues where many firms interact with heterogeneous investors in capital markets. To highlight these uni本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。