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ite business solicitors, auditors and stockbrokers to join board as directors because they think that these will provide sound business advice related to the business and board appointment is business savvy rather than strategist. He further states that most the outside directors are close to family and preserve internal family and financial interest. Moreover he states that board exists just to follow mandatory requirements imposed by regulation and in most of the cases board rubber stamp is approval of family decisions. Family keeps overall control on the business as CEO or Chairman where mostly eldest family member remain associated with business as chairman or chairman emeritus to provide valuable advice to younger family member who works as CEO. But the family business in India is changing itself according to market demand as recent annual reports indicate that families are preferring business skills for the appointment of CEO and board members hence modifying conservatism approach, but still proportion of family CEO are significantly higher as compared to non family. We found in our sample of 131 listed family firms that 72.51% of CEOs, 14.21% of chairpersons are family members out of which 37.5% are holding both positions. The family members holding CEO positions in most of the Indian companies are highly qualified with business management degree from globally recognised institutions with diversified experience, the families where family members are not well qualified now prefer non-family expert CEO and keep control over business as chairman/promoters by maintaining largest shareholding. CEO qualification data indicate that 32% of CEOs are foreign qualified (mostly from USA) , 42% of CEOs hold business management degree and most of the CEOs are qualified engineers ( 22%).

治理变量:对财务业绩的影响——Governance variables: impact on financial performance

公司董事会会议频率和性能——Board Meeting frequency and firm performance

Past literature addressing this relationship reveals a contrasting association between board meeting frequency and financial performance of the firm. Generally, it's a common assumption that boards who regularly meet may have positive impact on the financial performance. Lipton and Lorsch (1992) argue that frequent meeting of board of directors lead to effective governance which eventually results in improved financial performance. Conger et al (1998) suggest that directors need sufficient and well organised period of time to make effective strategic decisions for company welfare, hence board meetings help in improving the effectiveness of board. There is also a opposite view which suggests that board meetings has no real impact on board effectiveness or performance of the firms. Jensen (1993) argues that board meetings are routine task for which agenda is already set by CEO of the company, and maximum time of the board meetings is spent on these tasks which provides less opportunity for outside directors to exercise meaningful control over management of the company. He also suggests that board should show higher activities in the presence of problems and it should be relatively inactive in normal situations. Jensen (1993) further argues that while the consequences of higher board activity are unclear, higher board activity is a likely corporate response to poor performance. The first empirical study to 本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。