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e cited.

The primary ground of appeal was that the appellant had two previous convictions to which he had pleaded guilty, had no bearing on his propensity to tell the truth and argued that there was misdirection that rendered the jury’s verdict unsafe. The Court held that whether a defendant has a propensity for being untruthful would not normally be capable of being described as “an important matter in issue” unless telling lies was an element of the offence in question and a propensity to be untruthful would not establish the defendant was guilty of the offence charged. S.103(1)(b) provides “the question whether the defendant has a propensity to be untruthful in any respect, except where it is not suggested that the defendant’s case is not untruthful in any respect.” The court concluded that the judge had given the jury the Judicial Studies Board’s specimen direction without relating them to the facts of the case and was unlikely to have been very helpful. However, they did not considered the judge’s direction could have led the jury astray and that it did not affected the verdict. The appeal was dismissed.

Prior to the 2003 Act the bad character of the defendant was admissible primarily either under the similar fact doctrine or the Criminal Evidence Act 1898. In contrast, where bad character was brought out in cross-examination, under the 1898 Act this evidence was primarily relevant to the credibility of the defendant and not directly relevant to the issue of guilt. Under CJA 2003 evidence of the defendant’s bad character remains generally inadmissible prior to a finding of guilt but s.101(1) provides seven gateways, where such evidence may be admitted. One question before the Court in Campbell was whether the use to which the evidence could be put depended on the gateway through which it was admitted. In this case s.101(1)(d) was used to admit two of the defendant’s previous convictions.

In Highton and Campbell the issue concerned previous convictions admissible under gateway (g). The consequence adopted by Lord Chief Justice, evidence of propensity to commit offences can now be admitted under s.101(1)(g) even it is not relevant to an important matter in issue between the prosecution and the accused(s.101(1)(d)) or does not have substantial probative value in relation to an important matter in issue between the accused and co-accused(s.101(1)(e)). It seems most unlikely that this is the parliament’s intention. In R v Meyer [35] the appellant had been convicted of causing grievous bodily harm with intent. The judge directed the jury that the previous convictions of the accused were potentially relevant to credibility. It was held that previous convictions had no impact on his credibility and the appeal was allowed. It is clear from Meyer and Campbell the judge must ensure a clear direction to the jury on the use of bad character to which it is relevant. [36]

Before the 2003 Act, the earlier commission of commonplace offences in a commonplace way was not of sufficient probative worth to be admitted when a defendant was later charged with the same commonplace offence committed in the same commonplace way. It seems clear, however, that such evidence can now be admitted. In R v Hanson, [37] evidence was held admissible under s.101(1)(d) of a considerable number of previous convictions for burglary and theft from a dwelling. [38] Similarly in R v Gilmore, [39] three previous con