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in fact justified in your answer, despite your genuine lack of confidence at the time. (A NOTE ON ‘INTUITIONS’: When we talk of people’s intuitions we simply mean how people find it natural to describe something. We are not referring to any special faculty of deep insight.)

TASK 1: What do you think about this example? Why?

I contend that we can ignore the confidence condition. While it is true that we normally don’t claim to know something unless we have a significant degree of confidence that we are right, why should we say that unless you feel (or felt) confidence, it cannot be true that you know (knew) the matter in question? Confidence relates to your personal psychological attitude to your belief – the subjective strength of your conviction. It is not internal to the content of the conviction. Some people are naturally cautious and are suspicious of any temptation to be confident about anything. It seems harsh to say that, for that reason alone, a cautious person, ceteris paribus [a commonly used and convenient Latin phrase that means, literally, ‘all other things being equal’], knows less than a less cautious person, or – to take an extreme example – that ceteris paribus, the people who know the most are those who are extremely self confident, to the point of foolhardiness!

2. A Basic Account of Justification.

In its simplest form, it goes like this:

(1)  X knows that P

Iff [a common and useful shorthand for ‘if, and only if’]

(2)  P is true

And

(3)  X believes that P

And (the justification condition)

(4)  X is justified in believing that P.

But what makes (4) true (i.e. what makes it true that a person is justified in believing that something)?

Here’s a first pass:

(4’) X is justified in believing that P

Iff [there’s that shorthand again!]

(5)  X also believes that Q

And:

(6)  Q is true

And:

(7)  Given Q, P is more likely true than not.

A worked example (using corresponding numbering):

(1)  George knows that Helen is at home

Because

(2)  It is true that Helen is at home

And

(3)  George believes that Helen is at home

And

(4)  George is justified in believing that Helen is at home

Because:

(5)  George also believes that the light is on in Helen’s room

And

(6)  It is true that the light is on in Helen’s room

And

(7)  Given that the light is on in Helen’s room, it is more likely than not that Helen is at home.

3. So far so Good – but how Far is far Enough?

I guess most people find the above pretty convincing; indeed it might seem almost trivially obvious. So, can we stop there and move onto another topic? Have we now solved ‘the problem of (propositional) knowledge? Unfortunately not. Consider the question; does George also have to believe (7)?  Suppose you asked him and he said he does not believe it? Can we any longer say he was justified in believing Helen was at home, if (absurdly) he does not think that the ‘justification’ he gave actually works? Although this is an unlikely response (assuming George is not unusually bewildered), we should, in the name of complete rigour, add a clause that indicates he believes (7). So, to return to our original skeletal schema本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。