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lders who do not sell their shares to acquirors arevery low and even negative in two of the bids. These low bid premia may beexplained by banksÕ concern with interests other than those of shareholders;alternatively, they may result from the virtual absence of takeover regulationin Germany.
We begin by describing the methodology and data used in the study in
Section 2. The three cases of hostile acquisitions are discussed in Sections 3¡À5.Section 6 analyses the returns to shareholders of the target ®rms, the role oftakeover regulation, and the power of the banks. Finally, we derive some
conclusions in Section 7.
1386 J. Franks, C. Mayer / Journ

 

References
Franks, J., Mayer, C., 1997. Ownership, control and the performance of German corporations.
Mimeo.
Gottschalk, A., 1988. Der Stimmrechtsein¯uss der Banken in der Aktionarversammlungen der
Grossunternehmen, 5 WSI-Mitteilungen, pp. 294¡À298.
Jenkinson, T., Ljungqvist, A., 1996. Hostile takeovers and the role of https://www.51lunwen.org/ygshlw/2011/0726/1322369176.htmlbanks in German corporate
governance. Mimeo.
Ó¢¹úÅ£½ò´óѧ½ðÈÚ˶ʿÂÛÎÄNibler, M., 1998. Bank control and corporate performance in Germany: The evidence. Ph.D.
thesis. University of Cambridge.
J. Franks, C. Mayer / Journal of Banking & Finance 22 (1998) 1385¡À1403 1403

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