英语论文网

留学生硕士论文 英国论文 日语论文 澳洲论文 Turnitin剽窃检测 英语论文发表 留学中国 欧美文学特区 论文寄售中心 论文翻译中心

Bussiness ManagementMBAstrategyHuman ResourceMarketingHospitalityE-commerceInternational Tradingproject managementmedia managementLogisticsFinanceAccountingadvertisingLawBusiness LawEducationEconomicsBusiness Reportbusiness planresearch proposal

英语论文题目英语教学英语论文商务英语英语论文格式商务英语翻译广告英语商务英语商务英语教学英语翻译论文英美文学英语语言学文化交流中西方文化差异英语论文范文英语论文开题报告初中英语教学英语论文文献综述英语论文参考文献

ResumeRecommendation LetterMotivation LetterPSapplication letterMBA essayBusiness Letteradmission letter Offer letter

澳大利亚论文英国论文加拿大论文芬兰论文瑞典论文澳洲论文新西兰论文法国论文香港论文挪威论文美国论文泰国论文马来西亚论文台湾论文新加坡论文荷兰论文南非论文西班牙论文爱尔兰论文

小学英语教学初中英语教学英语语法高中英语教学大学英语教学听力口语英语阅读英语词汇学英语素质教育英语教育毕业英语教学法

英语论文开题报告英语毕业论文写作指导英语论文写作笔记handbook英语论文提纲英语论文参考文献英语论文文献综述Research Proposal代写留学论文代写留学作业代写Essay论文英语摘要英语论文任务书英语论文格式专业名词turnitin抄袭检查

temcet听力雅思考试托福考试GMATGRE职称英语理工卫生职称英语综合职称英语职称英语

经贸英语论文题目旅游英语论文题目大学英语论文题目中学英语论文题目小学英语论文题目英语文学论文题目英语教学论文题目英语语言学论文题目委婉语论文题目商务英语论文题目最新英语论文题目英语翻译论文题目英语跨文化论文题目

日本文学日本语言学商务日语日本历史日本经济怎样写日语论文日语论文写作格式日语教学日本社会文化日语开题报告日语论文选题

职称英语理工完形填空历年试题模拟试题补全短文概括大意词汇指导阅读理解例题习题卫生职称英语词汇指导完形填空概括大意历年试题阅读理解补全短文模拟试题例题习题综合职称英语完形填空历年试题模拟试题例题习题词汇指导阅读理解补全短文概括大意

商务英语翻译论文广告英语商务英语商务英语教学

无忧论文网

联系方式

英国硕士毕业论文:CEO薪酬和公司业绩(CEO compensation and firm performance)

论文作者:www.51lunwen.org论文属性:硕士毕业论文 thesis登出时间:2016-07-01编辑:anne点击率:3210

论文字数:12045论文编号:org201606300948565247语种:英语论文 English地区:英国价格:$ 132

关键词:CEO薪酬公司业绩英国硕士毕业论文

摘要:本文的研究有助于通过对非金融行业数据的分析,有助于对首席执行官薪酬的研究和理论研究。主要目的是检查公司业绩是否与现金和全面薪酬有关的。

Abstract摘要:


薪酬是代理理论背景下大量学术研究者的热点话题之一。代理理论中有两个相互矛盾的观点-最优契约理论和管理层权力观。因此,本文主要目的是研究通过整体金融产业绩效中CEO报酬与公司之间的联系。然后,测试是否有一些因素对补偿的影响。薪酬与企业绩效指标的信息可从2004到2009期间执行比较Compustat的数据库。在这篇文章中,OLS回归测试的实施将证明之间的联系的薪酬与公司绩效和薪酬等因素之间的关系。现金/总薪酬与公司绩效的结果显示正向关系是非常显著的。我发现公司规模和CEO薪酬杠杆起着决定性因素。CEO compensation is one of the hot topics for a large number of academic researchers under the context of agency theory. Agency theory has two contradictory views-optimal contract view and managerial power view. Therefore, the paper mainly aims toexaminethe links between CEO compensation and firm performance through the overall non-financial industry. Then, testing whether some factors have an impact on compensation. The information of compensation and firm performance indicator isavailable on Execucomp and Compustat database from the period 2004 to 2009.In this essay, an OLS regression test will be implemented to prove the links between compensation and firm performance and that between compensation and other determinants. My results show a significantly positive relationshipon both cash/total compensation and firm performance.I find Firm size and leverage are key determinants of CEO compensation.

Table of Contents
Chapter 1: Introduction 4
1.1 Background 4
1.2 Motive 5
1.3 The Purpose of the Study 5
1.4 Method 6
1.5 Frame and Structure 7
Chapter 2:Literature review and hypothesis development 8
2.1  The relative theorm 8
2.1.1  Principal Agent theory 8
2.1.2 Incentive theory 8
2.1.3 Research summery 10
2.2. Empirical evidence 12
2.3. Hypothesis development 14
Chapter 3:Large sample analysis 17
3.1:Methodology 17
3.2: Sample selection and descriptive statistics 19
3.2.1: Sample selection 19
3.2.2. Components of compensation 20
3.2.3 Descriptive statistics 22
3.3:Regression analysis and results 24
3.4:Elasticity test 30
Chapter 4: Small Sample study 34
4.1 Methodology 34
4.1.1 The Definition and principle of the DEA 34
4.1.2 The DEA details on the developing effects of financial enterprises 34
4.2 Description Analysis 35
4.2.1 Index Analysis 35
4.2.2 Correlation Analysis 38
4.3 DEA non-parameter anlaysis 39
Chapter 5: Summary and conclusion 43
Reference: 44

Chapter 1: Introduction介绍

1.1 Background
The relationship between CEO compensation and firm performance has always been a hot topic in academic literatures based on the problem of agency theory. The problem of agency, also called agency cost, arises from the separation of the ownership (principal) from management control (agent)(Berle and Means, 1932). Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest principals (shareholders) may not have knowledge to manage firms, and hence, they will employ another person (agent) to perform on their behalf. However, agents (managers) are likely to perform in their own interest to pursue their goals since principals and mangers have different maximum utility; for instance, managers prefer perusing the expansion of firm size, but shareholders prefer the growth of stock price. Thus,in order to keep their goal of consistency, principals appoint aboard of directors to monitor the managers’ behaviour. Fama and Jensen (1983) put emphasis that the most important function o论文英语论文网提供整理,提供论文代写英语论文代写代写论文代写英语论文代写留学生论文代写英文论文留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。

共 1/4 页首页上一页1234下一页尾页

英国英国 澳大利亚澳大利亚 美国美国 加拿大加拿大 新西兰新西兰 新加坡新加坡 香港香港 日本日本 韩国韩国 法国法国 德国德国 爱尔兰爱尔兰 瑞士瑞士 荷兰荷兰 俄罗斯俄罗斯 西班牙西班牙 马来西亚马来西亚 南非南非

   Europe (24-hours)
   EN:13917206902
   china (24-hours)
   CN:13917206902
在线客服团队
    全天候24小时在线客服
      QQ:949925041 
  

微信公众订阅号