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Advanced Corporate Finance Understanding the Corporation

论文作者:英语论文论文属性:讲稿 Lecture Notes登出时间:2010-02-11编辑:steelbeezxp点击率:4031

论文字数:300论文编号:org201002110903324520语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文

关键词:Advanced Corporate FinanceLimited liabilityOwnership structureCorporate governancedebt holders

Understanding the Corporation.ppt

Advanced Corporate Finance
Semester 1 2009

Understanding the Corporation

Corporate Finance

The study of how financial managers decide
what projects to invest in, and
how these projects should be funded
Underlying this is the need to understand
 the choice organisational form - private versus public, ownership structure, pyramidal versus horizontal
Need a theory of the firm

Characteristics
Limited liability
Equity has option like characteristics
Leads to established incentive outcomes
Corporate governance
Distribution and exercise of voting, control and cash flow rights
Ownership structure
Private (family/pyramidal/seed funding)
Public (concentrate/disperse)

Theory of the Firm
Nexus of contracts
Agency costs (incomplete contracts)
Property rights (ownership of assets conveys decision making rights)
Explicit versus implicit contracts
Who are the stakeholders
Management, equity and debt holders
Do we add to this customers, suppliers, employees, competitors, etc

Explicit Contracts
Firm represents the sum of the individual components (contracts) that compose it
All claimants fully protected by contract - complete contracting
Value additivity (NPV rule)
Capital structure
Irrelevance - market can replicate the firm - no (incremental) value created by financing choices
Governance
Voting and control rights rest with the residual claim - equity - votes have no value - cannot alter the cash flow distribution between parties

Incomplete Contracts
Contact incomplete
Does not specify the division of surplus in every contingency
Specify a set of constraints that shape ex-post bargaining over quasi-rents (governance)
Room for bargaining and rent seeking behaviour
Able to undertake actions that transfer wealth between parties

Governance Structures
Ex-post allocation rules influence ex-ante decisions
This is the real issue
Underinvest - not undertake actions that while value increasing are not properly rewarded by the governance system
Misallocate - expend resources on activities which don’t add value (might destroy) but which alter ex-post bargaining in decision makers favour
Risk allocation influences decision making
Inefficient bargaining outcomes

Implicit Contracts
Stakeholders broadened to include customers, suppliers, employees, competitors, etc
Firm is defined by the network of relationships between these stakeholders
Value beyond that captured in explicit contracts
eg reputation - Dell and after-sales service
Firm value differs from sum of parts by organizational capital

Changing Organisational Form
Nexus of specific investments
A combination of mutually specialised assets and human capital
Recognition of growth options - value created by right to exercise option
Asset transfer more readily achievable within firm - not impeded by property rights
Issue is who controls firm
Residual claim give control to shareholders but allocate this to board of directors - broader agenda
Costly to replicate within the market

Jensen and Meckling (1976)
Managerial compensation comprised of both
Pecuniary (wages etc)
Non-pecuniary
Even with owner-manager there is a non-zero level of non-pecuniary consumption
Question is does this change when we introduce external finance

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