t. Such as the organizational behavior model help us notice the importance of organizational structure and organization’s existing processes while the governmental politics model promotes us to understand the cognitives and interests of every participants.
Theory is best at explaining what has happened, but a complete theory, its greater value is reflected in the prediction and further policy recommendations. Admittedly, like Hofferber and Cingranelli said, we could not expect to establish a large and complete theory to predict accurately what would happen tomorrow. Each theory acquired from emprical results had a limitation when we applied. We only could modify the theory in order to respond to practical needs better rather than change the reality to fit the theory. And there is a contradiction that the more predictive ability theoretical model has, the more requirements on information, data and intelligence we need. However, Allison noted that even under the condition of severely limited information, introducing other models on the basis of a rational model to improve the ability in order to predict furture was still possible. Here, an important contribution of the theory is to help analysts realize what kind of intelligence should they strive to obtain to enhance prediction.
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