关于公司治理与绩效的变化研究:Governance and Performance Changes after Accusations of Corporate Fraud [2]
论文作者:留学生论文论文属性:硕士毕业论文 thesis登出时间:2010-12-23编辑:anterran点击率:16077
论文字数:14253论文编号:org201012231258141513语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文
关键词:GovernancePerformance ChangesAccusationsCorporate Fraudmarket
ct that these companies would enhance their internal control systems tolower the probability of future fraud. Such enhancements at the board level could also help repair the company’s reputation and restore confidencein the company. Dalia Marciukaityte is assistant professor of economics and finance at Louisiana Tech University, Ruston. Samuel
H. Szewczyk is associate professor of finance at Drexel University, Philadelphia. Hatice Uzun is assistant professor of finance at Long Island University, Brooklyn Campus, New York. Raj Varma is professor of finance at the University of Delaware, Newark. T Governance and Performance Changes after Accusations of Corporate Fraud
May/June 2006 www.cfapubs.org 33 In the study reported here, we examined whether the costs of corporate fraud produce alterations in the accused company’s internal control system as evidenced by changes in the structure of the board of directors and its oversight committees. Specifically, we examined whether the proportion of outside directors—as well as the independence of the board’s committees—increases after the revelation or allegation of fraud. Our investigation was motivated partly by the scant attention that changes in board structure after the accusation or revelation of fraud have received from academics. In a study of companies that were accused of a broad variety of frauds, Agrawal, Jaffe, and Karpoff (1999) examined performance and director turnover after the accusation, but they were unable to investigate changes in board structure because their data source (Standard & Poor’s Register of Corporations) does not report such important director characteristics as director independence and committee membership. In contrast, we obtained our governance data from proxy statements that provided rich detail on the companies’ boards. In a study similar to ours, Farber (2005) investigated changes in board structure after financial reporting fraud. We examined companies that were accused of a broader range of frauds than in the Farber study, including fraud of stakeholders, fraud of the government, financial reporting fraud, and regulatory violations. In addition, we compared the impact of court
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imposed costs with the impact of market-based reputational costs in inducing positive changes in corporate boards. We also compared the long-term financial and operating performance of “fraud companies” with the performance of a matched sample of comparable “no-fraud” companies. On the one hand, if the cost of fraud induces fraud companies to bring their internal control systems to the level of no-fraud companies, we expected to find comparable longrun performance between fraud companies and their no-fraud counterparts. On the other hand, if market participants perceive changes in board structures at companies accused of committing fraud simply as “window-dressing” arrangements or if reputation once lost cannot be easily regained, we expected fraud companies to underperform the matched companies over the long run. Fraud-Company Database We constructed a database of companies accused in the United States of committing fraud from press announcements of corporate frauds appearing in the “Crime–White Collar Crime” or “Fraud” listings in the general news section of the Wall Street Journal Index during the period 1978 through 2001. We used articles in the Wall Street Journal (WSJ) to determine when the f
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