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(eg. environmental, fair-trade, organic, Halal, etc.) is evidenced by their willingness to pay a premium for the high-quality products. The willingness to pay opens up an opportunity for low-quality producers (those which lack the special attribute) to take advantage by pretending to be that of high-quality, especially when only the producers know whether the desirable attribute exist in their products or not. Moreover, it is too expensive for individual consumer to directly monitor or verify these attributes.

Therefore, consumers could only decide their purchasing choice on subjective belief regarding the product's quality, which are based on all available information such as press report, word-of-mouth and labels when such adverse selection in credence goods market exist. Hence, producers cannot build reputation when production of low-quality imitating goods could not be detected and punished. Delayed detection of low-quality products allows its producers to imitate the strategy of their high-quality rivals, which hampered signalling use. Like other credence goods, Halal food products, through certified Halal brand/logo would improve the information asymmetry, but may carry the similar issues. These issues are discussed in Chapter 2.

It is common for credence goods to feature a communication scheme such as labels or brands to help consumers in making purchasing decisions. Moreover, these labels or brands often require authentication by legislator or a third-party organisations that have the proficiency in each field of specific credence quality attributes, thus involving additional costs.

In the Halal market, there also exist regulations by the government (eg. in Brunei, under the authority of Brunei Islamic Religious Council, Ministry of Religious Affairs) or third party organisation (eg. in United Kingdom, by Halal Monitoring Committee and Halal Food Authority, to name some). In which they certify a product through monitoring and indicating some guidelines for producers before granting a recognisable label on the products. Hence, this label helps consumers to make better decision choice. Moreover, a quality label that improves pre-purchasing information would increase welfare, and high-quality producers would always be willing to go through the necessary inspection as to reveal the products' quality to the consumers, unless the cost for verification is extremely high. The welfare affect of introducing Halal labelling is briefly discussed in the analysis, especially where Halal labelling opens up an opportunity to access additional consumers, ie. Muslims, also referred to the primary consumers.

The analysis of Halal in this paper is aimed to study the interactions of the market forces or what commonly referred to in economics as ‘invisible hand' of the demand and supply in Halal market. At the same time, considering the effects on introduction of labelling upon the level of equilibrium, in addition to other factors such as the additional demand by Muslims of primary market. This is a unique or special aspect which might not be available in previous studies on credence goods.

The following chapters are organised as follows. Halal concept is further discussed in the next Chapter 2. This chapter is int本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。