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urposes of exemplification, that Chomsky ( 1966a, p. 46 ) says a theory of generative grammar serves only as one component of a theory which can be made to accommodate the “characteristic creative aspect of language use.” He, himself, points out that whatever little attention Descartes devoted to language is subject to various interpretations and it should not be assumed that the various contributors to Cartesian linguistics necessarily regarded themselves as constituting a single tradition. I am also fully aware that the following argument can be made against me: though the communicative version of competence includes linguistic competence, that broad version of competence is not Chomskyan. If this is the case, communicativists need to show, very clearly, what type of grammar exemplifies their sense of competence. They should say, as well, how their view of grammar differs to the Chomskyan view of generative grammar and, as a result, can exemplify linguistic competence which they make part of their broad version of competence. If communicativists are to meet the requests I propose, they should offer very careful analyses of the bases to Chomsky’s view of linguistic competence. To the extent that they have not, they cannot, legitimately employ communicative competence as a basis to fulfilling their aim. Consider another argument against use of the basis - a cogent argument associated with Chomsky’s view of communication. In so far as communicativists emphasise the purposeful nature of language as central and necessary to their aim of fostering target language use, they would have to be concerned with the matter of conveying information to, and inducing beliefs about language in students. This is not a concern, though, which they can express, legitimately, by means of including linguistic competence in their broad version of competence. Chomsky’s view of communication, which is linked, inextricably to, and derived logically from, his pronouncements about knowledge, creativity and freedom from repressive authority, contrasts sharply with views about the purposeful nature of language. In what he sees as the importance of avoiding a certain vulgarisation with respect to the use of language, he claims that if the term, ‘communication’, means transmitting information or inducing belief, there is no reason to think that language - essentially - serves instrumental ends, or that the essential purpose of language is communication. ( Chomsky 1977, pp. 87 - 88 ). He adds that someone who offers a view of the purposeful nature of language ought to explain what she means in expressing that view and why she believes such a function and no other function to be of unique significance. It is frequently alleged that the function of language is communication, that its “essential purpose” is to enable people to communicate with one another. it is further alleged that only by attending to the essential purpose can we make sense of the nature of language. It is not easy to evaluate this contention. What does it mean to say that language has an “essential purpose”? Suppose that in the quiet of my study I think about a problem, using language, and even write down what I think. Suppose that someone speaks honestly, merely out of a sense of integrity, fully aware that his audience will refuse to comprehend or even consider what he is saying. Consider informal conversation conducted for the sole purpose of maintaining casual friendly relations, wit