英语论文网

. 46 - 47 ). He adds that serious investigation of generative grammars quickly reveals that rules which determine sentence forms and their interpretations are both intricate and abstract: the structures they manipulate “are related to physical fact only in a remote way by a long chain of interpretive rules.” And it is because of the abstractness of linguistic representations that the analytic procedures of modern linguistics - with their reliance on segmentation and classification, as well as, principles of association and generalisation in empiricist psychology - must be rejected. This is, of course, clear rejection by Chomsky of phrase structure grammar and principles of operant conditioning in behaviourist psychology popularised in audio-lingual approaches to target language learning. And it was partially, but significantly in reaction to audio-lingualism that communicative language teaching ( C.L.T. ) arose. The Chomskyan opposition to behaviourism should not, however, be seen as compatible with negative reaction in communicative language teaching circles to audio-lingualism. C.L.T., audio-lingualism, as well as behaviourism, are all experientially based. Chomsky’s views of generative grammar, linguistic competence and language teaching are decidedly not. In fact, his general remarks about contemporary language teaching are not complimentary. While dealing with reasons for distinctions between the difficulty in teaching target language to adults and the ease of childhood language learning, Chomsky ( 1988, pp. 179 - 182 ) made these remarks. Use your common sense and use your experience and don’t listen too much to the scientists, unless you find that what they say is really of practical value and of assistance in understanding the problems you face, as sometimes it truly is. (Chomsky, 1988, p. 182 ). He is, however, more explicit when he says persons involved in a practical activity such as language teaching should not take what are happening in the sciences seriously, because the capacity to carry out practical activities without much conscious awareness of what is being done is usually far more advanced than scientific knowledge. Ideas in the modern sciences of linguistics and psychology, which are of little practical use to understanding the distinctions, “are totally crazy and they may cause trouble.” He adds that modern linguistics has very little to contribute which is of practical value. Language, he says, is not learnt. It grows in the mind. It is, thus, wrong to think that language is taught and misleading to think of it as being learnt. ( Chomsky, 1982, pp. 175 - 176 ). I, therefore do not think it would be presumptious of me to conclude, at this point, that communicativists have no legitimate grounds for utilising their broad version of competence which includes Chomsky’s linguistic competence as a basis to fulfilling their aim. That aim is getting students to produce language as a central feature of their social interaction, in order to perform tasks which are essential or important to them. The communicativists are no where near to expressing a concern for analysing the issues, how the anti-experiential Chomskyan view of linguistic competence emerges from his interpretation of Russell’s, von Humboldt’s, Rousseau’s and Descartes’ ideas, how such a view can be reconciled to the communicative position which is not anti-experiential. Lest my conclusion be regarded as inappropriate, I must point out, for p