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sics since then and until now. We still want to know to what degree measurement is independent of the observer and how the laws of physics maintain uniformity throughout the universe from sub-nuclear particles to black holes. During this period, dozens of theories have sprung from the minds of scientists; and most have been eliminated. But these theories arise from the subjective dimension: from bringing subsidiary awareness into focal awareness; and, from realigning their embodied skills and knowledge.

In sum: integrating Popper and Polanyi results in the solution of the Darwinian problem in science. Though scientific theories evolve through a process of elimination-i.e., through trial and error-how are scientific theories created in the first place? The solution is that the implicit content of objective knowledge when articulated produces new problems; and subjective knowledge is the source of potential solutions when the focus of awareness is moved along the horizon of tacit knowledge. We create new knowledge by articulating what we implicitly and tacitly know. But this knowledge is bound within science as a distinctive culture with its own traditions, instruments, implicit contents in its objective theories and problems, and embodied in skills and personal knowledge. Both Polanyi and Popper agree that science forms a culture and that the cultural element of science is crucial to the functioning of science. How, then, does science form a distinctive culture in contrast to the humanistic culture of the arts and literature?

II. How Science and Art form Distinctive Cultures?

C. P. Snow brought to our attention what he named 'the two culture's problem.' The problem is that artists, or more generally, humanists, and scientists form two distinctive cultures and so cannot understand nor talk with each other. Is this a genuine problem? If so, can we resolve this problem?

This problem assumes that people from distinctive cultures either generally misunderstand each other, or always must misunderstand each other. Moreover, this problem assumes that for the most part, membership in the two cultures is mutually exclusive. These days very few challenge Snow's assumptions about cultures and about scientists and humanists. However, there has been a strong reaction to Snow's description of the problem; especially to his thesis that if literary types do not make an effort to understand science they will be left out of modern society and politics which tends towards dominance by the technology of technophiles and technocrats.

It seems that Snow's theory of the two cultures has turned into a prediction of contemporary post-modern society where techno-science and technocracy dominate. Humanists, in the broadest sense of the term meaning those who place a high value on human dignity, responsibility, and freedom, and who think that science and technology should serve and enhance humanity, are on the periphery of contemporary society. Firstly, the main model of humanity, social organizations, mind, and cognition is the information-processing model. Secondly, as the astute criticisms of some former AI theorists, Terry Winograd and Jerome Weizenbaum note: we first redefine human characteristics such as judgement and thinking in terms of computational models, and then we say that humanity is nothing more than computational machines. Everyt