摘要:美国特拉华大学留学生金融学硕士论文代写,关于日本银行的公司治理研究。(Japanese banks; Banking crisis; Managerial turnover; Corporate governance)
nce is a reliable proxy for executiveeffectiveness and interpret executive turnover following poor stock returns or profitabilityand as evidence of active internal governance.We do not detect a relation between turnoverand stock returns, profitability, or asset growth in the pre-crisis years of 1985–1990,however. This finding could reflect that absolute bank performance, especially whenmeasured by stock prices, was high during the pre-crisis period, and that relative performancedid not factor into evaluations of top executives. Perhaps bank managers wereevaluated on other criteria during this period, such as non-public performance measures orthe collective performance of firms in the banks’ client networks. A less benign interpretationis that Japanese bank managers did not face performance incentives in the late1980s when lending decisions exposed banks to risks that subsequently became manifest inthe collapse of asset prices, the recessions, and the bad loan problems of the 1990s.Incentives for Japanese bank executives appear to sharpen during the crisis period of1991–1996. Specifically, we find an inverse relation between bank performance and nonroutine
presidential turnover, i.e., when a president is replaced yet does not succeed to thechairmanship. For instance, the observed frequency of non-routine presidential turnoverfor a bank in the worst quintile of market-adjusted stock return is 7.0%, versus 1.6% for abank in the best performance quintile. Similarly, the frequency of non-routine turnover fora bank in the worst quintile of industry-benchmarked profitability is 15.1% versus about2.5% for other banks. Performance–turnover relations of this magnitude are commonlyinterpreted as economically significant and are comparable to those observed at U.S. banksand Japanese industrial firms (Barro and Barro, 1990; Kaplan, 1994; Kang and Shivdasani,1995). In short, our results suggests that Japanese bank executives faced consequences forpoor performance in the 1990s, a period otherwise characterized by inactive externalovernance and regulatory forbearance.
Our investigation contributes to our knowledge of corporate governance in severalways. First, relative to our understanding of corporate governance of Japanese industrial328 C.W. Anderson, T.L. Campbell II / Journal of
Corporate Finance 10 (2004) 327–354firms we know very little about the governance of Japanese financial institutions,particularly with respect to the banking crisis of the 1990s. For example, several studiesaddress whether Japanese banks face so-called ‘‘market discipline’’ and establish that
bank performance and risk are reflected in stock prices even when financial statementsare opaque and regulators follow policies that prop up poorly performing banks (Genay,1998; Brewer et al., 1999; Yamori, 1999; Bremer and Pettway, 2002). Our study isimportant because it suggests that internal mechanisms at Japanese banks provideperformance incentives to executives in the 1990s, a period otherwise characterized byregulatory forbearance and inactive external governance. On the other hand, Hoshi anKashyap (1999) indicate that deregulation, disintermediation, internationalization, deterioratingbalance sheets, and other characteristics of the Japanese banking sector in the1990s prompt a dire need for consolidation and restructuring. Jensen (1993) and Kaplan(1997) suggest, however, that internal governance mechanisms, in general, and performance–
turnover relations of the economic magnitu
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