, disclosure of information in published accounts has been prominent even though it was present but less prominent. A great amount of focus was given towards economic policymaking so as to become more transparent - particularly with respect to monetary policy, inflation targeting a very transparent monetary policy regime was adopted by and a number of central banks, including Sweden's Riksbank and Britain's Bank of England. Yet, few other countries like the United States have not yet subscribed to inflation targeting, but the Fed has also become much more transparent about its policymaking and operations over the past 15 years. The New Basel Accord (Pillar 3) has introduced a number of disclosure requirements that aim to improve the market's ability to assess a bank's risk and value.
The drift towards central bank being more transparent can be easily seen in our day to day life by casual observation. Some of the prominent examples of various central banks who have given great importance to becoming transparent are the central banks of New Zealand, Canada, the United Kingdom and Sweden. These few nations have adopted a framework of 'inflation targeting' from the early 1990s itself, which is characterized by an explicit inflation target and the publication of inflation forecasts.4 Many others countries have even started to give importance to having adopted greater openness as well, even if it's not in the form of inflation targeting or inflation forecasting. The few other central banks which have adopted this includes central banks in emerging markets like Brazil, the recently founded European Central Bank (ECB), and even the well established central banks like those of the United States, Japan and Switzerland.
文学观点-Literature Review
'Consider the legions of economists whose sole function it is to interpret U.S. Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan's every twist and turn of phrase so as to divine which way the monetary winds are blowing.'
- Caroline A. Baum, The Last Word p.645
From the above phrase, two important points can be looked upon; one is that by trying to assume what the actions of monitory policy will be the resources are used up. The other is that statements are being made by the central bank that might yield some insight into its future plans, but the messages are not typically transparent.
The economic policy outcome can easily be identified to a great extend by the increased transparency on central bank through various channels. It cannot be assumed that all the aspects points out the same way. Moreover, central bank transparency cannot be universally defined in all aspects6. The concept of transparency differs from authors to author in various ways, some may focus mainly on the decision-making process, while some others may focus on various other aspects like models, p
References, and even more some may look into the knowledge about the shocks hitting the economy, or the implementation of policy decisions.7
The private information's about the central bank's objectives or intentions can be easily assumed from the models derived by Faust and Svensson (2000, 2001), Jensen (2000), Geraats (2001a), and Tarkka and Mayes (1999). The model by these eminent economist states that, 'transparency is modeled as the degree of asymmetric information about control errors (Faust and Svensson (2001) and Jensen (2000)) or
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