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ganized.5 Since that time, former SOEs have come to rule not only China but make up an increasingly significant part of the Global Fortune 500. The institutional creation of the state-owned assets and supervision commission (SASAC) for central state-owned enterprises (CSOEs) in 2003, and its subsequent cascading to the provincial, municipal, prefectural, and district levels for local state-owned enterprises (LSOEs), underscored the institutional change that occurred in industrial organization and corporate form of state-owned enterprises. The consequences of institutionalizing stateownership of business assets, and their separation, reorganization and listing, has had a profound impact on the development and structure of large business groups in the past decade.6 The qiye jituan are China’s corporate form of business groups that mirrors keiretsu in Japan, chaebol in South Korea and other national business groups chronicled throughout the。

Genealogists trace the business group reform back to First Auto Works in mid-1980s (Sutherland 2001; Keister 2000; Hahn and Lee 2006). These scholars point to a group of 120 “national champions” or “trail groups” that are the basis of contemporary business groups in China, despite all three oil and petrochemical titans being left out of the trial groups. 4 Smyth (2000: 722) notes that in 1997 alone 3,000 enterprises were merged and 15.5 billion yuan in state assets was reallocated. 5 Lin (2008) argues insightfully that global economic—oil price and Asian financial—crises forced Sinopec and CNPC subsidiaries to agree to restructuring in 1997/8. But the overall restructuring across all SOEs nationwide implies a more compelling “wind” that would have forced the issue sooner or later. 6 Brødsgaard (2012), citing Lin (2003), notes that as a consequence of this overall (restructuring in oil and gas industry), local refineries and petrochemical manufacturers as well as domestic wholesalers and retailers were wiped out. Business groups consolidated power that previously had been much more regionally based. While the party’s influence was maintained through control of the appointment of CEOs and presidents of the most important companies, and the scope of business group control limited by SASAC, a fundamental reorganization of state, business and society had taken place. But this process was not a smooth exertion of central power over multiple, regional business groups with their own local powers and stakes: In one case, “it took extensive negotiations before the Shanghai city government finally agreed to the merger of the firms” (Hahn and Lee 2006: 215). This oversight of the hysteresis of development is what leads scholars such as Paik et al. (2007) to view China’s oil business groups as making decisions based on confluence of interests between government bodies top-down, erroneously giving the sense that NOPCs are not diversified beyond PetroChina, Sinopec and CNOOC.

World (Hahn and Lee 2006). The oil and petrochemical industry is also strategically protected by the Chinese government: beyond setting price regimes for oil and petrochemical products, it only has gradually liberalized tariffs on imports, only allowed imports to designated companies, prohibited free formation of joint ventures with foreign oil and petrochemical companies, and restricted availability of exploration and production licenses (Wu 2002). 7 The organizational stru本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。