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direct function of the size of its functional domain. As Dowd and Greenaway write: "The value of a particular currency to a user depends on how many others use it as well" (Dowd and Greenaway 1993: 1180). Central to this point is the issue of transactions costs: the expenses associated with search, bargaining, uncertainty, and enforcement of contracts. Transactions costs are inversely related to the number of market actors willing to accept a given money in payment. The larger the size of a currency's transactional network, the greater will be the economies of scale to be derived from its use -- what theorists call money's network externalities - and hence the greater will be the incentive to reduce rather than increase the total number of monies in use. No doubt there will be much experimentation in the expanding realm of cyberspace, and thousands of forms of e-currency might indeed be tried. But after an inevitable sorting-out process, the number of monies that actually succeed in gaining some degree of general acceptability is sure to be much lower. Many nascent currencies, unable to compete effectively, will simply disappear (just as many of the earliest versions of e-money have already done).
But neither is it likely that the number of monies will be reduced to as few as one, as economist Roland Vaubel has contended, exclusively stressing the power of economies of scale. In his words: "Ultimately, currency competition destroys itself because the use of money is subject to very sizable economies of scale.... The only lasting result will be ... the survival of the fittest currency" (Vaubel 1977: 437, 440). In fact, economies of scale are not the only consideration that matters, as modern network theory teaches (Thygesen et al. 1995: 39-45). Of equal importance are considerations of stability and credibility, which suggest that the optimal number of monies will actually be significantly greater than one.

In network theory, two distinct structures are recognized in the configuration of spatial relations: the "infrastructure," which is the functional basis of a network; and the "infostructure," which provides needed management and control services. Economies of scale, by reducing transactions costs, obviously promote a consolidation of networks at the level of infrastructure, just as Vaubel argues. But at the infostructure level, by contrast, the optimal configuration tends to be rather more decentralized and competitive, in order to maximize agent responsibility. Some finite number of rival networks will counter the negative effects of absolute monopoly, which frequently leads to weakened control by users and diluted incentives for suppliers. Hence a rational trade-off exists between transactional efficiency and currency stability, generating an incentive for diversification among market agents that will tend toward an equilibrium outcome somewhat short of complete centralization. Once electronic money gains widespread acceptance, a smallish population of currencies is far more likely than a single universal money.

II. Historical Perspective  历史视角

The notion of a multitude of currencies, many of them privately issued and all competing actively for market acceptance, is obviously at variance with conventional understandings of currency systems and monetary management. For most people, money is st本论文由英语论文网提供整理，提供论文代写，英语论文代写，代写论文，代写英语论文，代写留学生论文，代写英文论文，留学生论文代写相关核心关键词搜索。