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do this, I examine fund voting at the individual level. The dependent variable equals one if a fund votes with management, zero otherwise. The independent variables is 1 one if a fund is included as one of the pension investment options of the firm in which it invests, and zero otherwise. Table 6 illustrates that the coefficient estimate of the pension tie is positively significant, which indicates that a business tie increases by 15.3% the probability that a fund supports management. This result suggests that individual funds are more likely to vote with management if they are included as investment options in the pension plans of their portfolios firm, compared to other funds not included. Individual funds are more likely to vote against shareholder proposals to support management of the firms with large size and high market to book ratio, and with high institutional ownership.

结论和今后工作-V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS

This paper investigates whether pension business ties have an influence on mutual fund voting. As pension assets managed by mutual funds have been growing since the late 1990s, the concern that mutual fund managers could potentially pursue their own interest at the expense of fund owners is raised. This is because fund managers might have more incentive to support management in order to attract and retain pension business. In fact, recent studies provide evidence that mutual funds tend to support management of their portfolio firms through proxy voting or trading. Using the mutual fund voting outcomes fromoccurred the period from June 2003 to December 2005, I find a positive association between mutual fund voting and business ties. Analysis at the fund family level show that fund families are more likely to vote for the ISS unfavorable management proposals and to vote against the ISS favorable shareholder proposals. The influence of pension ties to mutual fund voting becomes four times stronger when there is voting divergence among funds within the same families. At the individual fund level, the a fund included as one of the investment options of the pension plans of the firm in which it invests is more likely to vote against the ISS favorable shareholder proposals. Overall, my findings provide the evidence that mutual funds are conflicted due to their pension business ties with the firm in which they invest.Only close votes have been included in the sample proposals at in this analysis. In that Since the probability that management causes an upset by encouraging mutual funds to support management in close votes is higher than in non-close votes, I expect that the difference in voting support between mutual funds with pension ties and mutual funds without pension ties in close votes would be greater than the difference in the voting support across two groups in non-close votes. I leave comparison between close votes for a future analysis.
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