Finance Essay-共同基金投票与养老保险 [9]
论文作者:www.51lunwen.org论文属性:短文 essay登出时间:2015-09-29编辑:chenyuting点击率:18201
论文字数:6336论文编号:org201509281522545339语种:英语 English地区:英国价格:免费论文
关键词:基金投票养老保险Proxy voting
摘要:本文是金融学essay范文,通过审查共同基金和公司之间的联系,并结合实际的共同基金投票结果,探讨养老保险业务是否会影响共同基金和公司之间的联系,并通过更多的激励机制来支持投资管理。
h as past performance, market capitalization, market-to-book ratio, G-index, and institutional holdings as control variables. Past one year performance is definied as the one year buy and hold market adjusted abnormal returns from the meeting date of proxy voting, and market capitalization is defined as the total number of shares outstanding times the closing price at the end of the year of the proposal. Market-to-book ratio is obtained by dividing the sum of market capitalization of equity and the book value of debt by the book value of total assets. As the sample period of this study is June 2003 to December 2006, I use the G-index published in 2004. Institutional holdings are calculated according to ownership held by institutions as of the end of the meeting year. Table 3 provides information on firm characteristics in the sample. On average, past one year returns for the sample firm are 13.1%, market to book ratio is 2.9, and market capitalization is 26,536 million dollars. Average institutional ownership of the sample firm is 71.4%, and average G-index for the sample firm is 9.4.
EMPIRICA分析-IV. EMPIRICA ANALYSIS
4.1 Analysis at fund family level
The main analysis of this paper explores whether business ties have an impact on mutual fund voting behavior by comparing the association between pension business ties and mutual fund voting support. I begin with the analysis at the fund family level and then extend my analysis to the individual fund level. At the fund family level of analysis, the dependent variable is the percentage level of votes in support of management. Following Ashraf et al. (2010), the percentages of voting support in favor of management for each mutual fund family are calculated by dividing the number of individual funds within the same fund families that vote with management for a proposal by the number of funds in the family that are eligible to vote on the proposal. [9] Therefore, the higher voting support indicates that funds are more likely to vote with management by voting for management proposals and by voting against shareholder proposals. As the distribution and the level of shareholder support of management proposals differ from those of shareholder proposals, I separately estimate the impact of pension ties on management sponsored proposals and on shareholder sponsored proposals. In addition, given the previous findings on the influence of the ISS recommendation to mutual fund voting, I segregate my sample into the ISS favorable proposals and the ISS unfavorable proposals. Therefore, through segregating the proposals according to sponsors and according to whether the ISS recommends passage of a proposal, the results of this study are separately presented for management proposals recommended by ISS, for management proposals not recommend by ISS, and for shareholder proposals recommended by ISS. The sSmall sample size of shareholder proposals not recommend by ISS does not allow me to include them in the analysis. All analysis is estimated using robust standard errors (White's heteroscedasticity consistent standard errors). The results also hold if I use standard errors with clustered by fund family, year, and firm.
Table 4 compares the percentages of voting support for management among mutual fund families with pension ties and mutual fund families without pension ties using a simple t-test. For the ISS favorable management sponso
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