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lations across a range of destination countries, implying that their networks are underpinned by transnational flows of knowledge (Gilbert and Koser 2003). Third, it appears that the payment of smugglers has increasingly taken on a transnational character. Early studies found that most asylum-seekers paid for their journey in full in advance of leaving their country of origin (e.g. Koser 1997a). More recent studies have found that most clients now pay only a deposit, and then pay the balance due either to a local agent in their country of destination or via remittances to an agent in a transit or the origin country (Gilbert and Koser 2003).
242 K. Koser The emerging picture is of a transnational business with distinct similarities to the transnational social networks and movements described by authors such as Cohen and Rai (2000). This analogy might be stretched even further by those commentators who view human smugglers not necessarily as ‘evil’, but as ‘white knights’ delivering asylum-seekers to safety (Salt and Hogarth 2000). The interaction between asylum-seekers and migrant smugglers would appear to be an example of transnational networks genuinely challenging the ability of states to control their borders. This, for example, is how most commentators explain the ‘rebound’ in asylum applications in Europe since the late 1990s. In response to rapidly increasing numbers of ‘spontaneous’ asylum-seekers in the early 1990s, a raft of policies were introduced to try to restrict the entry of asylum-seekers. These appeared to succeed in the short term*hence the significant drop in asylum applications through the mid-1990s. In the longer term, however, it is clear that numbers rebounded, to reach new historical highs in countries such as the UK by the beginning of the twenty-first century. The consensus is that this rebound resulted from the growth in human smuggling and its increasing sophistication in negotiating illegal entry routes. Similarly, commentators have responded to recent UK government figures that show a significant downturn in asylum applications in 2003 by arguing that in fact people are continuing to arrive in sustained numbers, but are not being detected and are no longer bothering to claim asylum. There would appear to be a vicious circle, whereby states introduce new policies, then smugglers find a way around them (Koser 2002b). Even if it does help them gain entry into the industrialised world, asylum-seekers pay a price *literally and figuratively *for their interaction with migrant smugglers. At least three sources of vulnerability *economic, social and political *have been identified that arise directly from smuggling (Koser 2001b). Economic vulnerability arises from the enormous sums charged by human smugglers (recent estimates are that a journey from Afghanistan to the UK costs between $8,000 and $12,000). Even those with sufficient access to capital actually to leave their country of origin in the first place often arrive in transit countries, and later destination countries, without money and in debt. Many asylum-seekers have reported having little choice but to work illegally, and in several cases this has included work as prostitutes. Smuggling can also result in the isolation of asylum-seekers from potentially supportive ethnic networks. This arises where smugglers*and not the asylum-seekers themselves * choose the final destination, which may or may not be a country where there are significant p